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Executive Summary
This study was commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-
operation (NORAD). It is a follow up to “Assessing the Restructuring of
SADC – Positions, Policies and Progress. Chr Michelsen Institute (CMI
Report R2001). Data and documentation for the study were collected from
Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in
the period 3 June to 7 August 2002, during which time the team interviewed
more than 110 officials and stakeholders.
The study examines the status of SADC’s restructuring exercise as at June/July
2002. In addition, it reviews SADC’s relation to continental initiatives like
NEPAD and AU, SADC’s engagement in the Zimbabwe crisis and finally the
role of non-state actors in regional co-operation and integration. More
information on and analysis of the background for the restructuring and
developments to September 2001 may be found in the 2001 SADC Report
referred to above1.
Status of restructuring
The study finds that support for the restructuring process among members has
not weakened. Whether problems of support may arise in the future will
partly depend on the success of restructuring and progress on substance. On
several counts there has, however, been slippage compared to the quite
optimistic timetable set in early 2001 by the “Report on the Review of
Operations of SADC Institutions”, below called the review of operations
report.
Most changes in governing structures have been implemented. Council and
Summit meetings have been held regularly. The Organ was established as a
part of SADC structures in 2001. The first meeting of the Integrated Council
of Ministers (ICM) had, however, not yet been held by August 2002. ICM is a
new feature of SADC governance, which is aimed at improving support to the
Secretariat and reducing the number of ministerial level meetings.
The review of operations report proposed that SADC National Committees
(SNCs) be set up. They were to form links between member states and SADC.
They would comprise government representatives as well as representatives
from the private sector and civil society. By June 2002 SNCs were reported to
have been established in all but three countries. The study found, however,
that few, if any, were functioning. Indeed in some countries they were
unknown even by persons associated with SADC. One important function that
SNCs could not perform was the co-ordination of inputs for the development
of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP).
                                           
1 J. Isaksen and N. Tjønneland, Assessing the Restructuring of SADC – Positions, Policies and
Progress. Chr Michelsen Institute Report R 2001:6
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The purpose of the RISDP is to provide member states, SADC institutions and
key stakeholders with a coherent and comprehensive development framework
for the operationalisation of SADC’s Common Agenda and Strategic Priorities
over the next decade with clear targets and time frames. The timetable as at
June 2002 aimed at the completion of an interim report and presentation of a
draft to the ICM in August and to a Council meeting in November. The ICM
meeting was later postponed and the status of the RISDP is uncertain.
The review of operations report proposed a study of SADC’s organisational
structure which would determine staffing requirements, functions,
responsibilities and reporting lines, as well as grading and salary scales for the
restructured SADC Secretariat. Uncertainty over the modalities of conducting
the study, which should have been finalised by the end of 2001, led to delays.
In June 2002 consultants had been shortlisted and it was expected that
selection would be made for the study to start in July/August 2002. It is not
likely that final decisions on the results of the study will be taken before the
early 2003 meetings of Council and Summit, after which recruitment may
commence.
A key feature of the restructuring was the closure of the 21 Sectoral Co-
ordination Units (SCUs) and Commissions that were central to the old
organisation. These entities were located in member states. Units were funded
nationally and Commissions through SADC. They were engaged in both
sectoral policies and operational work in the respective sectors. Upon closure,
their policy and planning functions were to be transferred to SADC HQ in
Gaborone and incorporated in one of the four Directorates2 of SADC. There
has been progress in this aspect of restructuring. A number of the Units, which
largely dealt with national projects, constituting some 80% of all SADC
projects, could relatively easily be closed down. Because Units and
Commissions dealt with both policy and operational issues whereas the new
Directorates are supposed to focus on policy and planning, problems occurred
in some instances. A few operational issues, which could have been left
“hanging” when Units or Commissions were closed down, have had to be
dealt with ad hoc. In some cases operational tasks have been left temporarily
to Unit/Commission. The Southern African Transport and Communications
Commission (SATCC), for instance, appears to be functioning much as before.
In one case, operational activities were to be outsourced. In the case of Marine
Fisheries (Namibia), it has been proposed to set up an operational agency.
In the new structure, four new directorates at SADC headquarters will
perform sectoral policy and strategy functions. Up to July 2002, two of the
Directorates had been launched according to the timetable. It is likely that the
two to follow will be formally launched at the planned time. The process of
building Directorates to full strength has been hampered since the Secretariat
has no basis for employing people in permanent posts before the
organisational study has been concluded. The interim solution chosen at the
                                           
2 The Directorate for Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI), the Directorate for
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR), the Directorate for Infrastructure and
Services and the Directorate for Social and Human Development and Special Programmes.
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outset was to staff the Secretariat with seconded personnel from member
states for a certain period. Expecting delays in final recruitment beyond this
period, the Secretariat contacted Member States and has received promises
from most, if not all, that they will extend the arrangements for an
appropriate time.
There appears to be some tendency to bureaucratisation of the Secretariat.
Circumstantial evidence indicates that bureaucratic tactics of delay and
evasion of responsibility may be on the increase. The review of operations
report saw staff training and development as part of the implementation of the
restructuring exercise. In view of the danger of bureaucratisation, training
ought to be initiated at an early stage but has understandably not been given
much attention in the present situation where permanent staff have not been
recruited.
A new formula for membership contributions has been approved. The formula
will be applied from the 2003/04 budget year and is based on the GDP of
member states but includes cut-off points so that no state (except Seychelles)
pays less than 5% of the total budget and none more than 20%. A budget for
2002/03 has been approved. More work has been done on a self-financing
mechanism, a Regional Development Fund and arrangements for private
sector stakeholder participation in regional projects.
With regard to donor funding, a “mini” conference for International Co-
operating Partners (ICPs) has been held and a limited range of needs presented
by SADC. Although donors seemed very enthusiastic in their support of the
activities proposed, SADC has not as yet responded in a general way. In a
subsequent communication with the Secretariat a group of core donors
“signalled their willingness to work in a far more co-ordinated way than
hitherto to ensure effective, flexible joined up assistance to SADC in a timely
and transparent manner”. The formation of this group is encouraging. In
future, it may develop towards the adoption of some form of “basket
funding” for SADC, although it seems a remote possibility at present.
Progress in substantive areas
The report points out that while slips in the timetable are not critical in the
short run, both member states and ICPs may lose enthusiasm if delays
continue unchecked. Despite all staff shortages and the administrative
turbulence caused by the restructuring exercise, over the last year SADC
moved perceptibly forward on substantive issues. Some initiatives and results
are mentioned below:
SADC took an early initiative for humanitarian assistance to deal with the
emerging food crisis in the region.
The Free Trade Area (FTA) is under development. Agreement has been
achieved on a major part of the Rules of Origin. So far, no country has sought
recourse to the formal dispute settlement mechanism. The team received some
reports of problems but most of them have been sorted out bilaterally.
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The more fundamental problem of the FTA is that members of the same
trading group span many income levels and stages of development. Reflections
of these problems have come up in discussions between South Africa, the
BLNS3 and the poorest group, the MMTZ4, but cannot be said to be critical
issues at the present stage. Preparatory work is taking place to document all
relevant national legislation relating to trade in services. In the related field of
competition regulation, work on model legislation is under way.
Negotiations with the EU over the establishment of an Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) will start in September 2002. This type of agreement will
have to be in place to make trade relations between EU and SADC countries
compatible with WTO rules. The existence of several overlapping integration
and trading groups in southern and eastern African area will make it difficult
for the EU to form an EPA with one of the groups without involving the
others. This may perhaps pull in the direction of a greater eastern and
southern African EPA where SADC, COMESA and EAC become sub-sets.
Such a development might change the future dynamics of regional integration
in southern Africa.
The report points out that the recent agreement and signing of Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) for the areas of “Macroeconomic Convergence” and
“Co-operation in Taxation” are important beginnings. The MOUs are meant
to become part of a future macroeconomic harmonisation protocol, which
together with the Trade Protocol will constitute the two main pillars in
SADC’s economic integration strategy.
The SADC Organ
Considering the Organ for Politics, Peace and Stability, the study finds that a
good measure of progress has been made. Work has been done to establish
procedures and mechanisms for intervention. A strategic Indicative Plan for
the Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), which was
established in May 2002, should be submitted to the SADC Summit during the
second half of 2002. Under the auspices of the Interstate Defence and Security
Committee (ISDSC) a mutual defence pact has been drafted for submission to
the Summit. However the Organ still lacks operative policies, financial
resources and operational capacity. Further work on policy development in
the areas of operation is likely to reflect NEPAD and its effort to develop an
approach to governance, conflict management and enforcement mechanisms.
With reference to Zimbabwe, the report points out that principles and policies
in the subject area of the Organ do not easily translate into implementation
and politics. A SADC task team led by President Muluzi started off in
September 2001 by publicly critiquing one of its member states for the first
time in the history of SADC. The intervention had little impact and there was
virtually no diplomatic follow-up. The study argues that it is difficult to escape
the conclusion that SADC has not sufficiently pursued the issue of governance
and human rights since it began to address the Zimbabwe situation. The
                                           
3 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland
4 Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia
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perceived need for maintaining stability in the region and the existence of
solidarity bonds between some of the region’s leaders has prevailed.
Continental organisations – AU and NEPAD
The launch of the AU and the emergence of NEPAD have to some extent
clarified the continental setting for the African Regional Economic
Communities (RECs), among them SADC. There is widespread agreement that
NEPAD is a framework and process of the African Union. The study shows
that during the two years before the G8 summit at Kananaskis and the first
AU summit at Durban there were considerable consultations between the two
parallel movements that led respectively to NEPAD and the transition from
OAU to AU.
The report examines relations between SADC, NEPAD and AU/AEC. Both
NEPAD and the AU/AEC consider regional economic communities like SADC
to be their essential building blocs. SADC countries have representation at the
top level of both AU and NEPAD. Each of the RECs will be represented in the
AU Commission by two Commissioners. Some RECs, including SADC, have
also established protocols with the AEC. In the short run, it is, however, not
likely that the links between SADC, NEPAD and AU will be intensively used
since they all will have to concentrate on settling internal and organisational
matters.
It is likely that in various ways SADC will influence and be influenced by
NEPAD. SADC would take NEPAD into account during the ongoing
restructuring. There will be a need for regional/continental co-ordination
mechanisms if and when the NEPAD infrastructure programme, based on
regional projects, takes off. SADC’s MOU on Macroeconomic Convergence
contains a peer review mechanism, which in some respects overlaps with the
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of NEPAD and a need for co-
ordination may arise. The report also considers to what degree REC members’
ability to draw ODA and other resources through NEPAD might, by
association, be negatively affected by a “rogue” member of the REC.
Role of Non-State Actors
The report examines the role of non-state actors in regional co-operation and
integration. SADC is, by its treaty, committed to “co-operate with and
support the initiatives of the peoples of the region and NGOs”. Of the 17 000
NGOs in the region (10 000 in South Africa), there is only a small minority
that has a regional or international network. The umbrella body, SADC-
CNGO, which operates in the interim with very limited resources and staff
from Gaborone, is likely to sign a MOU as specified in the SADC Treaty.
Among the NGOs there is a number of research institutions that see their
responsibility as being in monitoring and analysing SADC as well as in
researching regional co-operation/integration generally. The greater group of
NGOs are probably the sectoral networks that are active in such diverse
sectors as human rights, media, agriculture, gender issues etc. A number of
NGO are also active in training and capacity building.
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The study points out that NGOs may not be involved in regional matters as
much as they could be because they are generally weak and unaware of the
change in SADC’s policy towards NGOs. There are, however, examples
showing that NGOs have had substantial impact on SADC. Some NGOs with
regional links perform services and engage in advocacy at the regional level
but most of them have no regional links and concentrate their activities at the
national level. They may, however, potentially play a significant role in
guarding the maintenance of SADC norms and standards.
Conclusions
The study finds that the conclusions drawn in the earlier study are still valid.
Development and events in the region in the past year, however, warrant
comments and a few additional points.
The most important challenge for SADC in the near term is still the
completion of the institutional restructuring process. The delay in starting the
study of SADC’s organisational structure has slowed down the pace of
progress in building the Secretariat’s capacity, thereby also retarding progress
in implementing SADC’s protocols. Delay in making SNCs function means
that the visibility of SADC at the national level and therefore the popular
sense of ownership are negatively affected.
The study argues that the preparation of the RISDP had been allotted
insufficient time and resources at the outset. The plan is vital for creating
consensus between member states at the level of strategy and implementation
as well as to communicate SADC’s plans to all stakeholders. The little
information that was available about the RISDP indicated that the framework
was academically well conceived, but relatively little attention had been given
to the planning process, consensus making and inputs from member states and
civil society.
Concerning NEPAD and AU, it is pointed out that the G8 Kananaskis summit
and the Durban summit of the AU rendered some clarity about the relations
between SADC and these continental organisations in the short run. This is
not likely to lead to very active relations in the near future.
Despite notable progress in developing a common approach to the Organ for
Politics, Defence and Security and its area of operation, further build-up of the
Organ should remain an important focus for SADC.
The study raises the question of what are the driving forces behind SADC.
South Africa and Zimbabwe have to some extent fuelled the “political engine”
of SADC but there are signs that fear of criticism from the other countries for
“taking over” SADC may make South Africa less active. The report states that
unless an alliance of member states takes a strong interest in driving SADC,
there is a danger that the organisation will be left politically unguided to the
detriment of its attention to crises and development problems in the region.
Although most of the NGOs and other non-state actors in the region are quite
weak, they are doing work in parallel with SADC in many fields. Constructive
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co-operation between SADC and these organisations and providing them with
support will strengthen the machinery for implementation of co-operation and
integration.
Whereas there is progress in the development of the FTA, some fundamental
problems related to differences in levels and structures between the SADC
economies are still present. The thorny issue of distribution of benefits from
integration has not been dealt with.
The report points to important perspectives for the imminent negotiations on
an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union. The
prospect of a greater Southern and Eastern African EPA, subdivided into three
of four of the present regional organisations, is considerable, and so are the
political and technical questions to be negotiated and solved.
Norwegian Support to SADC
Norwegian support to SADC was briefly examined in the CMI 2001 report
referred to above. The conclusions still stand, but the present report elaborates
some of the points.
To help speed up the restructuring process, the report recommends
considering the possibility of a “slush fund”. Under such an approach, SADC
would indicate total unspecified needs within the broad area of institutional
restructuring for a period of 2-3 years. Disbursement would take place with a
minimum of formality through a well functioning link with the Harare
Embassy. The conclusions of the Mini donor meeting pointed to a number of
needs for support that could be handled within such a mechanism.
It is recommended that in the near term Norway should consider sectoral
aspects of its longer-term support to SADC:
(a) there appears to be little doubt that Norway has world class expertise
and technology in the energy sector. Norway should as soon as possible
communicate with SADC and other relevant regional organisations to
initiate a discussion of how Norwegian expertise and funding may be
applied within the sector.
(b) SADC has made bold attempts to address political, peace and security
issues and to establish procedures of operation. Norway should, at an
early stage, consider how the Organ may be supported and initiate a
discussion about this with SADC.
(c) The study finds that Norway should seek to support NGOs with good
potential to promote the acceleration of regional integration.
If Norway decides to step up its support for regional integration, it will be a
matter of working with several organisations in the region, be they connected
to SADC or free-standing non-state actors. The requirements for Norwegian
aid management in the region will by far surpass present capacity. It will be
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necessary to consider how to strengthen management regionally and in the
NORAD HQ as well as to improve co-ordination between them.
It is recommended that Norway seek an active role in the core ICP group
formed after the mini donor meeting in February 2002. The fact that the
RISDP is unlikely to form the basis for the conference with the ICPs in
October 2002 requires a different format for the conference than what was
initially planned.
In the short term, with implementation mechanisms both in SADC, AU and
NEPAD at a nascent stage, the scope for donor support to regional projects
within a specific continental context is small. The infrastructure, water and
energy sectors are, however, areas where in the longer run NORAD will have
to consider the continental aspects of future support to SADC.
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1 Forming the restructured SADC
1.1 Background
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was
formed in Lusaka, Zambia in 1980. Its objectives were focused around
mobilisation and co-ordination of development assistance, co-operation on
development projects and reduction of dependence on apartheid South Africa.5
Significantly, SADCC gave post-independence southern African governments
their first platform for regional economic co-operation.
The Declaration and Treaty establishing the present day Southern African
Development Community (SADC) was signed in Windhoek, Namibia in 1992.
At the time, the original nine SADCC members6 had expanded to ten,
Namibia joining in 1990. South Africa joined in 1994 and later Mauritius, the
Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
SADC’s objectives, as outlined in the Common Agenda of the 1992 Treaty,
revolve around
• Promoting development, poverty reduction and economic growth
through regional integration;
• Consolidating, defending and maintaining democracy, peace, security
and stability;
• Promoting common political values and institutions which are
democratic, legitimate and effective;
• Strengthening links among the people of the region; and
• Mobilising regional and international private and public resources for
the development of the region.
From the start, SADC was a highly decentralised organisation. Strategies,
policies and project management within the sectors of operation were handled
by individual countries through “Sectoral Units” or by “Commissions” and
guided by committees of ministers. In 1996 an Organ on Politics, Defence and
Security Co-operation was established. SADC was highly project based, the
portfolio containing about 470 projects of which many had a strong national
character.
SADC recorded important achievements over the years, particularly in
infrastructural development and in fostering a sense of regional belonging.
However, during the latter half of the 1990s, questions were asked about the
                                           
5 Cf. the overview and analysis of the history of SADCC in I. Mandaza & A. Tostensen, Southern
Africa in search of a common future: From the Conference to the Community, Gaborone: SADC
1994, and K. Lambrechts, “The SADC’s Origins”, pp. 17-28 in The IGD Guide to the Southern
African Development Community, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue 2001.
6 The founding members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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organisation’s ability to promote regional co-operation and integration. A
study on Review and Rationalisation was published in 1997.7 At the 1999
Summit, the SADC Heads of State and Government directed the SADC
Council of Ministers to initiate a comprehensive review of the operations of
SADC institutions, including the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-
operation. The Review Committee, composed of representatives from
Namibia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, produced a
comprehensive report with detailed proposals for a restructuring exercise8
(referred to below as the Review of Operations Report).
The Review of Operations Report, which became a blueprint for the
restructuring process, recommended, as an immediate follow-up:
• Amendment of the treaty and realignment of objectives with SADC Plan
of Action (SPA) priorities
• Creation of SADC National Committees
• Development of a Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
(RISDP)
• Undertaking of a study on SADC organisational structure to determine
staffing requirements, functions, responsibilities, reporting lines, grading
and salary scales for the new structure
• Phasing out of Commissions and Sectoral Co-ordination Units (SCUs)
• Creation of Directorates in the Secretariat and secondment, recruitment
and redeployment of staff as well as development and training
• Determination of financing for the new structure, including a study on
the development of a new formula for member states’ financial
contributions and creation of a Regional Fund.
The sections below examine the status of the components of restructuring as
they stood at August 2002. More information on the background for the
restructuring and developments up to October 2001 may be found in the 2001
SADC Report.9
1.2 Amendment of the Treaty
Most of the amendments in the treaty were aimed at framing the new
organisational structure (Cf. Annex Figure 1),
- "The Integrated Committee of Ministers” (Article 9 and 12)
- ”Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation” (Article 9A);
- "Regional Development Fund" (Article 26A),
- "Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan" (Articles 1, 12 and
16A)
- "SADC National Committee" ( Article 9 and 16A )
- "Troika" (Article 9)
                                           
7 C. Chipeta: Review and Rationalisation of the SADC Programme of Action, Vol. I (Executive
Report) and II (Main Report), CSIR and Imani 1997
8 Report on the Review of Operations of SADC Institutions. SADC, April 2001
9 J. Isaksen and N. Tjønneland, assessing the Restructuring of SADC – Positions, Policies and
Progress. Chr Michelsen Institute Report R 2001:6
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-  A possibly important step was to change the preference for national
ministers to represent Member States in the Council of Ministers from “a
Minister responsible for economic planning or finance” to ”a Minister for
foreign or external affairs”
- The revised Treaty also provides for a new financing formula (Article 28)
- The Treaty strengthens the scope of sanctions for non-fulfilment of
obligations assumed under the treaty (Article 33)
- Article 8, on admission of new members, now requires an application for
membership to be handled by the Council of Ministers before it goes to
Summit.
Some of the amendments also signalled changes in direction:
- The determination to eradicate poverty and meeting the challenges of
globalisation were made stronger in the preamble.
- The mainstreaming of gender and the fight against poverty is stressed
along with the fight against HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases.
- Under "SADC Common Agenda” (Article 5A), the references to poverty
alleviation, democracy and the promotion of political values were
strengthened.
The amendments were signed at the Blantyre Summit of 14 August 2001.
1.3 SADC National Committees
The amended SADC Treaty provided for the creation of SADC National
Committees (SNCs) consisting of key stakeholders. Apart from Governments,
the stakeholders were to include the private sector, civil society, non-
governmental organisations, and workers’ and employers’ organisations. The
composition of SNC members shall, according to the Treaty, reflect the core
areas of integration and co-ordination (i.e. the functions of the four
directorates, see Fig 1 below).
It is the obligation of each member state to create such committees. The
committees shall according to the guidelines inter alia10
· provide input into the formulation of SADC policies, strategies and
programme of action;
· co-ordinate and oversee the implementation of the SADC programme of
action;
· promote and broaden stakeholder participation in SADC affairs in
member states;
· facilitate information flows and communication between member states
and the SADC Secretariat; and
· co-ordinate the provision of inputs for the development of the Regional
Indicative Strategic Development Plan and monitor its implementation.
                                           
10 Cf. the SADC Secretariat’s Draft Guidelines on SADC National Committees (n.d. (2001). The draft
guidelines were approved at the Council of Ministers Meeting in August 2001.
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It was envisaged that the National Committees would fill the temporary
vacuum which was expected with the phasing out of Sector Co-ordinating
Units (SCUs) from member states to the Secretariat.
The Review of Operations Report said that SNCs would be created before the
end of 2001. Later, the Executive Secretary expressed the hope that they
would be established by the end of March 2002. A table showing the formal
status of SNC as it was reported to the Council of Ministers meeting in June
2002 is contained in Annex Table 1.
In terms of formal establishment, August 2002 saw three countries
outstanding. In South Africa, a decision about the structure of the SNC was
still awaited, reportedly because the integration of SADC and NEPAD liaison
within the same Committee was taking time. In Lesotho, establishment was
said to be “at an advanced stage”. In DRC the situation was described as
uncertain.
With the formalities of establishment mostly done, a next step is the
“launching” of SNCs to make them publicly known and to begin performing
their functions. As per early June 2002 there was, however, little evidence that
they were generally functioning. In the countries where the team had access to
information about SNC activities11 only a small group of people directly
concerned with SADC appeared to have information on the existence of
SNCs. In general, there is little or no activity taking place in the Committees.
The SADC Secretariat appears to be concerned over the lack of action.
Member states have been encouraged to discuss internally and with the
Secretariat the ways in which the Committees will be set up. The greatest
obstacles for Member States to make SNCs take off are likely to be national
capacity and finance. In cases where donor funding for the cost of running a
secretariat is not available, it will take time before such costs can be covered
from already constrained state budgets.
Some unclear points in the SNCs’ mode of operation still need to be settled.
The lines of communication and lines of authority between the SNCs, the
Secretariat and other structures are not clear. A question remains about issues
falling under the Organ which are not yet included in the tasks of the national
committees but will presumably need to be so. Finally, the role of parliament
and parliamentary oversight in relation to the SNCs have not been addressed
in the SADC draft guidelines.
While SNCs are not functioning, their responsibilities cannot be discharged.
This is likely to have a negative effect on official as well as popular influence
on important processes like preparing the RISDP, improving SADC visibility
and creating a feeling of ownership among the public in the Member States.
                                           
11 Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe
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1.4  The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
(RISDP)
The main tasks ahead for SADC are to operationalise protocols and
harmonise policies. The envisaged key instrument to achieve this is the
development of the RISDP.
The main purpose of RISDP is to “provide member states, SADC institutions
and key stakeholders with a coherent and comprehensive development
framework for the operationalisation of SADC’s Common Agenda and
Strategic Priorities over the next decade (2002 - 2011), with clear targets and
time frames”.12 The plan will take into account programmes, activities and
projects currently being undertaken by various SADC sectors and institutions.
The Review of Operations Report sees RISDP as a statement of key objectives.
The (a) economic objectives are focused on the development of measures to
alleviate poverty, including industrial development, trade, macroeconomic
policies, investment and infrastructure. The political priorities (b) concern
democratic governance and mechanisms for conflict prevention, management
and resolution. The (c) social goals focus on gender issues, human resources,
combating HIV/AIDS and social welfare. Three other priorities are
particularly mentioned: development of science and technology, research and
development; development of effective disaster preparedness and management
mechanisms; and consolidation of international co-operation with other
regional groupings.
Key functions of the RISDP are the need to communicate objectives to
stakeholders groups (international organisations, donors) and to Member
States and the public at large. The RISDP will also form a basis for the
Secretariat to function efficiently and focus on implementation. Also,
considerable contributions from donors will be contingent upon SADC having
a realistic plan indicating appropriate areas for co-operation within SADC’s
overall strategic framework.
RISDP Progress?
According to the plan drawn up in the Review of Operations Report,
formulation of the RISDP would be completed by December 2001. The
deadline was later changed to completion in June 2002. Until May 2002,
when contacts with Member States were to take place, the RISDP process was
largely limited to the activities of the core preparation team within the
Secretariat. Where possible, sectoral strategic plans were to be produced by
SCUs. Where the SCUs had been phased out, Directorates would produce the
sectoral plans.
The preparation team was composed of three members from the Secretariat
and four regional consultants. A Review Committee would represent the
Member States. A steering committee, consisting of the Executive Secretary
                                           
12 SADC Council of Ministers at its August 2001 meeting in Blantyre
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and two senior staff members, would support the co-ordination of the RISDP
project.
During the CMI team’s visit to the region (June 2002) the expectation was
that a final report would be submitted to the Chief Director by end of July
2002. By late June 2002 it was indicated that the RISDP team had nearly
completed an interim report. The plan was then to present a draft RISDP to
the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) in August 2002 and a final to
the Council meeting expected to take place in November 2002. Later it was
indicated that the ICM meeting would be postponed, allegedly because of
difficulties with the finalisation of the RISDP. In September 2002 it was
decided to extend the RISDP deadline to mid 2003.
There is little information that may suggest what the character and outline of
the RISDP might be. Information about the inception report indicates that the
process and document outline were professionally/academically well
conceived, with considerable weight placed on data collection and literature
studies. Relatively little attention had, however, been given to the planning
process, consensus building and inputs from member states and civil society.
The September 2002 extension mentioned above might have the effect of
improving the process and bring more involvement of the member states.
The RISDP is likely to deal with politics, defence and security matters as
background factors for social and economic development and not include
them as policy matters.
Donors have been looking forward to support the development and
functioning of the restructured organisation, taking directions from the
RISDP. Speaking after the June 2002 Gaborone summit the hope of SADC’s
Executive Secretary was that “by the time of the consultative conference, the
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, which seeks to spell out
concrete projects arising from the SADC Common Agenda, will be
complete…”. Unfortunately, this hope has been dashed.
While the preparation of RISDP has fallen behind the original deadline, it is
important to have in mind that there is a trade-off between hitting the
deadline and producing a high quality policy document. The RISDP process
will set concrete directions and build consensus about the organisation’s future
path. Such a process should be expected to take time and to cause temporary
disagreement. Slips in the overly ambitious timetable13 may at first seem
serious but should not be thought of as more important than the completion
of a thorough plan preparation process.
                                           
13 This argument is made in the 2001 CMI report on SADC (R 2001: 6)
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1.5 Phasing out Commissions and SCUs, building up the
SADC HQ
According to the restructuring programme adopted by the Summit14, the
Sectoral Committees, Sector Co-ordinating Units and Commissions will be
phased out within a period of two years from 9 March 2001. The Review of
Operations Report gave clear deadlines for the establishment of a new
structure for the SADC HQ. A Department of Strategic Planning, Gender and
Development and Policy Harmonisation managed by a Chief Director and
reporting to the Executive Secretary was to be established by August 2001.
Under the Department there were to be four sectoral Directorates, all
established before the end of 2002.
Considerable progress has been made during 2002. Most of the Sectoral
Committees under the old structure have had their last meetings, the phase-out
of SCUs has moved forward and the establishment of Department and
Directorates of the HQ has formally proceeded according to the time frame.
As the examination below will show, SADC is, however, still far from the
point where the old structures are gone and the new are functioning.
The Department of Strategic Planning, Gender and Policy Harmonisation was
set up to strengthen the Secretariat in executing its new functions. A Chief
Director heads the Department, which in mid-2002 had five staff members: a
Principal Economist, two members working on gender issues and two on
statistics.
Some functions, including monitoring and evaluation, co-ordination of donors
and co-operating partners and regional operational activities, do not appear in
the new organogram. How the Secretariat will deal with these functions is still
to be seen.
By September 2002 three of the four Directorates had been formally
established.  Until the study of SADC’s organisational structure has been
concluded and acted upon, Supervisors for the Directorates will be drawn
from the SADC Secretariat staff. Final decisions on the details of staffing
requirements, functions, responsibilities, reporting lines, grading and staff
salary scales will have to wait for the outcome of the study.
Figure 1 overleaf illustrates how the former SCUs and Commissions were
formed into clusters (e.g. the three SCUs for Industry and Trade, Finance and
Investments and Mining formed one cluster) or sectors. Each cluster or sector
was to be handled by a Directorate (e.g. the Directorate for Trade, Industry,
Finance and Investment (TIFI)).
                                           
14 At the Extraordinary Summit meeting held at Windhoek, Namibia on 9 March 2001.
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Fig 1: SADC New Structure
Source: SADC
Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment Cluster
Under this Cluster two co-ordination units, the “Industry and Trade Co-
ordination Division” (SITCD) located in Tanzania and the “Finance and
Investment Co-ordination Unit” (FISCU) located in South Africa, were phased
out at an early stage. These priority sectors were the first components of the
TIFI Directorate (see below).
The Mining Sector Co-ordination Unit, located in Zambia, was closed down
recently. The last meeting of the SADC Mining Ministers, formerly supervising
the Mining sector, took place on 2 August 2002. The SADC Mining Sector
Strategic Development Plan, which was approved by Council at its June 2002
meeting, would be an input into the RISDP. The meeting also decided on the
following priority areas with regard to development of the SADC mining
sector: Harmonisation of policies and standards, data and knowledge
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acquisition, a competitive skills base and technology base as well as
establishment of a commercially viable small/medium-scale mining industry
with special attention to enterprise support mechanisms.
The ministers recommended that a forum for better understanding the focus
areas be organised and agreed to create five technical committees to support
the TIFI Directorate in the implementation of the SADC Mining Sector
priorities. The technical committees’ relations to SADC organisational
structures were not elaborated.
The ministers also noted issues of concern from the “Mining Industry
Association of Southern Africa” and “SADC Women in Mining Trust”. These
included formalising their relationship with SADC Secretariat, rules of
procedure for the Mining Ministers meetings and small/medium scale mining
support.
The Directorate for Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI) was
launched in August 2001, on schedule. In June 2002, at the time of the teams’
visit, 14 persons in all were working on issues related to trade, finance and
investment. The interim supervisor of TIFI was an experienced SADC staff
member who had long been responsible for trade issues. Seven of the staff
were seconded from member states, of whom one was from the SITCD in
Tanzania. An additional three were consultants, of whom two were recruited
from within the region and one externally. Finally, TIFI also could be said to
include a Project Management Unit of three, responsible for work on the
Protocol for Finance and Investment.
With the exception of two staff members, the whole of TIFI is occupied with
trade issues. An action plan for the Directorate has been drawn up.
Whether the size and composition of the Directorate will be right for the
amount of work that will have to be done can only be assessed through the
planned study on organisational structure and subsequent experience. It is,
however, clear that a large number of important issues will have to be dealt
with by TIFI. Two important rounds of negotiations that will require
considerable capacity in the Secretariat are the WTO Doha Development
Round and the oncoming negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPAs) with the EU (see section 1.7 below). Most likely, additional staff will
be required to increase the Secretariat’s capacity to deal with these issues.
An important project on the finance side of TIFI is to prepare a Protocol on
Finance and Investment. It was expected that this would be based on a series
of Memoranda of Understanding to be completed by mid-2002, developed
into a protocol by mid-2003 and ratified in 2004. The fieldwork in 2002
indicated that a more flexible approach to deadlines had to be adopted, the
idea being that MOUs for the different sub-areas would be tested “on the
ground” before a protocol was developed. (see section 1.7 below)
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Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Cluster
The situation in the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources cluster15 is less
clear. It appears that at least part of the Harare FANR is operating as before.
This unit’s contribution during the regional food crisis of the early nineties
was strongly commended. It would be unwise to close down or disrupt its
activities in the present emergency situation. The Marine Fisheries (Namibia)
and Inland Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife SCUs (Malawi) have been closed
down, or are about to be closed. The Southern African Centre for Co-
operation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR) has been closed down and its
assets transferred to the government of Botswana. There is a bit of uncertainty
as to what has happened with the Sector Coordinating Units for Crop
Production (Zimbabwe), Livestock Production and Animal Disease Control
(Botswana) and Environment and Land Management (Lesotho).
The new Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR)
was launched in December 2000, in line with the plan. FANR now has a staff
of 6 seconded experts and two technical advisers led by a supervisor who is a
long-term employee of the SADC secretariat.
The present staff complement will clearly have grave difficulties in handling
the very extensive field covered by the former SCUs. Again, the study of the
organisational structure has to be awaited before more staff can be recruited.
At the present time, with a major food crisis looming in the region, it is
important not to disrupt work by attempting to undertake a reorganisation
simultaneously.
An interesting initiative taken recently is the recommendation of a Ministerial
Meeting in July 2002 to create a technical facility within the FANR
Directorate that will mobilise financial and technical resources to support
SADC Member States in implementing national land and agrarian reforms.
Infrastructure and Energy Cluster
In the Infrastructure and Energy cluster, the last Committee of Energy
Ministers Meeting was held on 27 July 2002. The meeting noted that the
SADC Energy Commission Technical Unit will relocate from Luanda to
Gaborone. The Director of the SADC Energy Commission Technical Unit was
to move to the SADC Secretariat. In view of the current workload and the
need to ensure continuity, Ministers agreed to recommend to the Review
Committee that two staff members seconded from Member States support the
Director.
The Southern Africa Transport and Telecommunications Commission
(SATTC) in Maputo is apparently still in action as before. The only difference
                                           
15 Crop Production (Zimbabwe); Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (Zimbabwe);
Agricultural Research and Training (Botswana); Livestock Production and Animal Disease
Control (Botswana); Inland Fisheries (Malawi); Marine Fisheries and Resources, (Namibia);
Forestry (Malawi); Wildlife (Malawi); and Environment and Land Management (Lesotho)
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is that the information flow to and from Member states now goes through the
Secretariat in Gaborone.
The Infrastructure and Services Directorate was to be launched in December
200216.
Social and Human Development and Special Programmes Cluster
The Social and Human Development and Special Programmes (SHDSP)
cluster, comprised the SCUs dealing with Culture, Information and Sport
(Mozambique), Health (South Africa), Employment and Labour (Zambia),
and Human Resources Development (Swaziland). The cluster will be handled
by the Directorate for Social and Human Development and Special
Programmes, which was launched in September 2002.
Problems with the phase-out of SCUs
Many of the SCUs had a low level of activity or were in charge of essentially
non-regional projects. Although host governments experienced practical
problems like the redeployment of SCU staff, most SCUs were therefore
relatively easy to close down. The audit of SCUs assets has now been
completed.
In a few instances there were, however, problems related to the restructuring
itself typically when SCUs with both operational and policy responsibilities
were transferred into the Secretariat, which was not supposed to have
operational responsibilities. For example, it is hardly practical to run marine
fisheries projects from Gaborone. Namibia, which has co-ordinated this
sector, has noted that wholesale closure of a Marine Fisheries Unit would
leave out important operational aspects. It was therefore proposed that there
be established an autonomous “Regional Fisheries Agency” which may deal
with operational issues and other functions not covered by the Secretariat in
Gaborone.
Another example is in the forestry sector, co-ordinated in Malawi. It has been
agreed that the Malawi Co-ordinating Unit, although formally closed, will
manage the ongoing projects until their conclusion. Information on the
projects will, however, be redirected via Gaborone and not, as before, flow
directly to the forestry agencies in the member countries.
In the Wildlife SCU, the regional office of the International Union for
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) will implement one of
the main ongoing programmes (Survey of Wetlands in the SADC region).
Whereas the closing of SCUs appears to be on track, operational activities may
still take place in “Agencies” and / or be outsourced to NGOs or consultancy
companies. It appears, so far, that the secretariat has adopted a pragmatic and
                                           
16 SADC Public Relations and Information Unit, 18 September 2002
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flexible approach to the SCU aspect of the restructuring and has exploited the
scope for learning from the process. It is important to make sure that
operational issues are not ignored to the extent that well-run projects are put
in jeopardy. On the other hand, if many SCUs are, in fact, continuing to
operate much like before, located in the countries formerly responsible for the
SCU, it may lead to complaints by other countries that “their” SCUs should
also be maintained. There is thus a danger of obfuscating a key element in the
whole restructuring process.
Study on SADC Organisational Structure
The transfer of part of SCUs’ and Commissions’ responsibilities clearly made
it necessary to restructure the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. The Review of
Operations Report envisages a study determining staffing requirements,
functions, responsibilities, reporting lines, grading and salary scales for the
new structure. Whereas it was originally recommended that the study would
be undertaken by external consultants, the Council of Ministers decided in
August 2001 that the Secretariat should play a stronger role in the preparation
of the study.  Later, presumably during the Zanzibar Council meetings, it was
decided that consultants would have to be used.
Recruitment of personnel for the necessary strengthening of the Secretariat
cannot be commenced before Council and Summit have accepted the
recommendations of the study. Unfortunately, the delays in completing the
study will restrain action in a number of the other priority areas of the
restructuring exercise as well as in the majority of SADC’s substantive
implementation activities. It was first thought that the study would be ready
by the end of 2001. The uncertainty about modalities took some time and
later the matter also seems to have proceeded slowly within the Secretariat.
By June 2002 a short-list of consultants had been produced and interviews to
build a sound base for selection of a firm to be selected were to start shortly.
Although some sources indicated that the study would take about three
months, the complexity and range of the questions to be dealt with would
indicate at least double that time. Also, the mobilisation time for the
consultants, after having been awarded the tender, would add perhaps a
month. Decisions by Council and Summit could therefore at the earliest take
place in January/ February 2003. Considering the time taken for
advertisement, selection of candidates and the fact that good candidates will
tend to require long periods from selection to actual employment, it is not
likely that improvement in the human resource situation will come before late
2003. It is therefore likely that the organisation will have to use seconded staff
far into 2004. If the Jan/Feb Council / Summit decision point slips, it will
easily add another half year of delay.
As was indicated by SADC at the February 2002 Mini Donor Conference, the
decision-making process with regard to the structure and size of the Secretariat
should in principle not be finalised before the RISDP and the “Study on SADC
Organisational Structure” has been completed. The number and grading of
posts will in principle have to be linked to the planned outputs as defined by
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the RISDP. If this principle is to be followed to its logical conclusion,
considerable delay may be expected. Both the governing levels and the
Secretariat ought to consider temporary solutions to accelerate action.
Staff development and training
The Review of Operations Report also points to staff development and
training as an important part of the implementation of the new structure. This
appears to have been perceived by the Secretariat as less important than other
tasks, in particular since recruitment has not yet started. There is some
indication that a degree of bureaucratic sclerosis has set in. Staff members,
overwhelmed by the amount of work, have resorted to time tested
bureaucratic techniques of delay and evasion of responsibility. It is important
that active development and training be started at an early stage. Otherwise a
culture of hardened government bureaucracy may easily become rooted in the
secretariat. The presentation by the SADC Secretariat at the Mini-donor
conference pointed to a number of areas where the Secretariat needed
strengthening.
It is praiseworthy that the Secretariat has set up the new structure within the
deadlines. However, to some extent the establishment of the Directorates has
been a formal one without providing the capacity that is needed. Practical
issues, such as the delay in preparing the organisational structure report, as
well as accommodation problems in Gaborone, explain some of the problems.
Preparing for further delays, the Secretariat has contacted Member States to
arrange for extension of secondments and this has been generally accepted.
1.6 Financing and donors
SADC’s 2002/2003 budget of USD 12.8 million was approved by the Council
of Ministers at Zanzibar in February 2002. In addition to the cost of running
the Secretariat, the budget covers operational expenses, programmes and
projects and capital expenses for SATCC and the Regional Tourism
Organisation of Southern Africa (RETOSA). Council also decided to review
the financial situation of the organisation every six months to monitor its
financial performance. It has also been agreed that budgeting in SADC shall be
based on a performance budgeting system with a three-year rolling budget
starting 2003/2004.
The total budget appears to be on the low side compared to the USD 12
million budget presented in the Review of Operations document and which
did not cover expenditure for SATCC and RETOSA. Information for further
analysis of the budget is not available.
The Council also approved a new formula for membership contributions,
which will be applied from the 2003/04 budget year.17 The formula is based on
GDP in such a way that each country contributes a fraction of the total SADC
budget that is equal to its fraction of the total of the SADC countries’ GDP.
                                           
17 See Annex Table 4.
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An upper cut-off point of 20% and a lower one of 5% have been introduced.
This means that South Africa, although its GDP is nearly 80% of the total
GDP for SADC, will not pay more than 20%. The only country exempted
from the formula is Seychelles, whose contribution is set at 2%. There is some
doubt about the status of the decision on membership contributions. In a
communiqué after the SADC Ministers of Finance meeting on 8 August 2002,
it was reported that “Ministers gave direction to the Task Team working on
the development of an equitable membership contribution formula.” The
remaining work may, however, be of a purely technical nature, not affecting
the nature of the formula itself.
The idea of “self financing” for the SADC budget by means of regional levies
or the like has been considered for some time. During the team’s visit to the
region (June 2002) there was scepticism both as to the usefulness of such a
funding source and as to whether SADC would be able to utilise additional
funding in an appropriate manner.
Finance Ministers of the region have, however, formalised the search for a
self-financing mechanism. The extraordinary meeting of the Committee of
Ministers for Finance and Investment in December 2001 considered that there
was a need to take a longer-term view on the issue of financing. The self-
financing mechanism should be sustainable and responsive to the needs of the
region. Ministers established a task force comprising of Botswana, Malawi,
Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and the Secretariat to address the
issue. The group was later expanded to take on board the issues related to the
planned Regional Development Fund, mobilisation of resources for investment
in the region and participation of stakeholders in financing development
programmes and projects in the region.
The Secretariat arranged a so-called mini-donor conference in February 2001.
This was partly in response to concerns that unless SADC communicates its
financing needs and to some extent indicate preferences for individual donors’
roles, there is a risk of erosion of funding potential.
The conference gathered most of the important donors with fairly high-level
representation. The overall objective of the conference was to “forge
consensus between SADC and its International Cooperating Partners (ICPs) on
key issues and approaches that will facilitate and expedite the SADC
restructuring process so as to strengthen the SADC Secretariat and other
SADC institutions to play a more effective and catalytic role in promoting
overall development of the region in line with the broader goal of creating an
integrated economic community in Southern Africa”18.
The conference made it fairly clear that SADC considers it problematic to
handle large amounts of donor funding at a time where future directions and
needs for support have not been clarified by the organisation through e.g. the
                                           
18 Mini Donors Conference in Support of SADC Restructuring. Theme Document:
“Strengthening SADC for Sustainable Regional Integration” SADC Secretariat, Gaborone.
February 2002.
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completion of the RISDP process. One of the challenges facing the SADC
secretariat was said to be the capacity to articulate and package needs. In the
words of the Executive Secretary: ”The irony is that we need resources to
exploit these resources”. Although the Secretariat had some idea of the
magnitude of resources required, a more accurate determination will be
possible only after the completion of the RISDP
Potential areas of donor support indicated at the conference were (key
priorities marked with an asterisk “*”):19
• Translation of needs into a programme and creation of a donor co-
ordination unit within the Dept of Strategic Planning*
• Operationalisation of RISDP including development and financing of
business plans for Directorates *
• Establishment of remaining Directorates*
• Support for on-going programmes within the framework of restructuring
• Strengthening capacity for resource mobilisation and programming
• Possibility of establishing a proposed “Technical Analysis Support Fund”
• Management support to improve the internal operations of the
Secretariat
• Feasibility study on the establishment of a Regional Development Fund
• Skills upgrading for professional and support staff of the Secretariat
• Establishment of SADC National Committees in Member states.
The mutuality between recipients and donors were emphasised: the meeting
stressed the importance of exercising commitment to programmes, accepting
counterpart contributions, ensuring sustainability of programmes and projects,
using clear procurement processes and practices, exercising partnership in
programme design, and consulting properly during programme and project
implementation.
ICPs signalled their preference for being dealt with on a collective rather than
an individual basis and to consider a basket of needs when defined since this
would foster co-ordination among donors and avoid overlaps. They also
underlined the need for frequent consultation. SADC would prepare a “matrix
of donor support”, which, once finalised, would be shared with ICPs.
Assistance in translating various needs into a consistent “basket” was said to
be an immediate need for support. The Secretariat will approach ICPs once
Council approval is obtained. This has apparently not yet happened.
After the mini donor meeting, some concern was communicated to SADC by a
“Core Group” of ICPs 20. They felt that there were important bottlenecks in
the Secretariat and that the Department of Strategic Planning, Gender and
Policy Harmonisation, the four Directorates, as well as the secretarial support
to the Organ should be swiftly operationalised, even before the results of the
                                           
19 Following three paragraphs are excerpts from: “Mini Donors Conference in Support of
SADC Restructuring. Record of Proceedings”, Gaborone, Botswana, 18 February 2002.
20 EU, Germany, France, DFID and the US, all with a presence in Gaborone. Other donors
mentioned as having a “significant interest in working with the core group” were Belgium,
Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the World Bank and the IMF.
C M I
16
organisational structure (job evaluation) study were known. It was indicated
that this might be done through technical assistance “as far as possible by
regional experts”, for which the Core Group offered funding. It is possible
that this may work and speed up the RISDP and the study of SADC’s
organisational structure, but there has so far (July 2002) been no general
response from SADC. Whatever the result of this initiative may be, it should
be noted that this is the first time donors have offered support to SADC as a
group, as the communication says: “signalling their willingness to work in a
far more co-ordinated way than hitherto to ensure effective, flexible, joined-up
assistance to SADC in a timely and transparent manner”.
Neither the RISDP process nor the organisational structure study is likely to
be substantially complete before the October 2002 meeting with the ICPs. As
far as can be understood, the Secretariat aims at presenting a rough global
estimate of needs and some indications of programmes and projects. Decisions
on donor responsibilities and co-ordination of programmes and projects
might, to a considerable extent, be left to the donors. This would seem to call
for a better organisational link between SADC and the donors.
1.7 Progress on substantive issues
Although the restructuring issues will occupy the centre stage of SADC for the
time being, it should not be forgotten that SADC’s raison d’etre is the
substantive projects and processes of co-operation and integration between
Member States.
The fact that the Secretariat appears to attach a low priority to outward
information flows and has only a tiny (but very active) PR section limits the
flow of information to outsiders and often makes it difficult to appreciate the
volume of work that takes place in the organisation. The recent redevelopment
of the SADC website has, however, helped. The organisation is active on a
number of substantive issues despite the turbulence and workload created by
the restructuring exercise. The following sub-sections examine some important
areas of SADC’s activities.
The Regional Food Crisis
For the 2002/2003 crop year the SADC region faces a cereal deficit of 5.19
million tonnes and a maize deficit of 3.20 million tonnes21. The deficit is due
to drought, excessive rains and floods, and low carryover stocks from the
previous season. Crop assessments conducted jointly by SADC/FAO/WFP in
April/May 2002 in Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland,
Zambia and Zimbabwe indicate that the SADC region is facing its worst food
crisis since the 1992 drought. A total of about 13 million people in the region
will be in need of food assistance between mid-2002 and the next harvest in
April 2003. WFP has called the crisis the worlds’ worst crisis at the present
time.
                                           
21 Figures for April / May 2002.
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SADC has taken the initiative to several meetings, at both technical and higher
levels, to analyse and remedy the situation. A joint SADC/UN Appeal for
Humanitarian Assistance covering food and non-food requirements has been
launched. Also, it has been agreed to revive the Logistics Advisory Centre
which during the early 1990s crisis co-ordinated transport logistics for the
importation and distribution of food among Member States. As a long-term
measure, SADC will undertake policy reviews on irrigation development,
alternative sources of carbohydrates, the incorporation of livestock and fish
products into the food security assessments, and will conduct a review of
regional food reserves.
It is unclear what role SADC played in drawing up the UN plan for
humanitarian assistance to the region22. In the UN report, the organisation is
made mention of as one of the “stakeholders”. It is also mentioned that SADC
will have to play a role in solving logistical problems such as road tolls,
customs procedures and third party transport arrangements to allow trucks
from one country to operate in another. SADC’s information systems will be
utilised. Assessment activities will be co-ordinated through the common
consultative structure of the SADC FANR Regional Vulnerability Assessment
Committee (RVAC) based in Harare.
In August 2002 it appeared that the SADC/UN appeal was well underway
with several commitments for delivery of food and for financial resources.
Difficulties did arise over the refusal of some of the countries to accept gifts of
genetically modified maize. WHO hoped that further progress, both on
resource mobilisation and on the issue of genetically engineered maize, would
be made during the World Summit on Sustainable Development taking place
in Johannesburg over 26 August to 4 September 2002. SADC may play a role
as an arbiter in this case.
The Free Trade Area
The SADC trade protocol, signed in 1996, aimed, among other things, to
establish a SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) within eight years. On 1 September
2000 the SADC countries started implementing the Trade Protocol. The
accord will cut tariffs on 12,000 defined product areas in the SADC region. By
2008, the intention is that 85 percent of intra-SADC trade will be freed from
tariffs. From 2008 to 2012, the sensitive products will be liberalised, creating
a Free Trade Area by 2012. 12 of the 14 SADC members have now ratified
the Trade Protocol, DRC and the Seychelles remaining.
The objectives of the protocol range wider than to establish an FTA and
include:
· promoting the liberalisation of intra regional trade in goods and services
based on fair, mutually equitable and beneficial trade arrangements;
                                           
22 Regional Humanitarian Assistance Strategy in Response to the Crisis in Southern Africa.
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe. July 2002 – June 2003.
United Nations, New York and Geneva, July 2002.
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· ensuring efficient production within the SADC that reflects the dynamic
comparative advantages of its members;
· creating an enabling environment for domestic, cross-border, and foreign
investment and
· enhancing the economic development, diversification and industrialisa-
tion of the region;
The areas of co-operation identified by the protocol include the elimination of
obstacles to intra-SADC trade, customs procedures, trade laws, trade related
investment matters, measures for cross-border investment and other trade
related issues such as trade in services and trade development. Article 25 deals
with competition policy, and exhorts member states “to implement measures
within the community that prohibit unfair business practices and promote
competition.”
The organisational mechanisms for running the implementation of the Trade
protocol are separate from the SADC Secretariat (TIFI) and governing
structures comprise a “SADC Trade Negotiating Forum”, a “High Level
Committee on Market Access and Rules of Origin” and a “Committee of
Senior Officials”. Furthermore, under the “SADC Heads of Customs”
meetings there are four working groups dealing with such issues as rules of
origin, customs co-operation, customs systems and a transit action plan.
Since the start of implementation, particular attention has been paid to forging
an agreement on rules of origin. At the team’s visit to Gaborone in June 2002
the Secretariat expressed hope that outstanding issues would be brought to a
conclusion in the very near future. The 5 August meeting of the SADC
Committee of Industry and Trade Ministers in Windhoek agreed on rules of
origin for most if not all goods under the following remaining Customs
chapters: plastic products (39), machinery and mechanical appliances (84),
vehicles (87), most products of electrical equipment (85) and measuring and
surgical instruments (90). The negotiations on rules of origin seem to have
been substantially concluded. The ministers, however, decided to create a
mechanism for regular review of rules of origin in order “to ensure that their
contribution toward the regional economic development and integration
efforts is enhanced”23.
One remaining problem is wheat products. Whereas nearly all countries
appear to agree that unprocessed wheat may be freed up, there is still
disagreement on wheat flour and wheat based products. Significant wheat
producers (SA and Zimbabwe) are pressing for rules that stipulate a high local
content for wheat products to be deemed to “originate” in the SADC region.  
The implementation of the FTA is apparently running relatively smoothly.
There has been no use of the dispute settlement mechanism as yet. A couple of
instances of disagreement have been solved without recourse to the formal
mechanism. One example is the case where SA had erroneously excluded
                                           
23 SADC Media Release on 16th Meeting of the SADC Committee of Industry and Trade
Ministers, Windhoek, Namibia, 5th August 2002
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copper cables, virtually stopping exports from Zambia. SA conceded the error
and the problem was solved. Another example was that some of the MMTZ
(Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia) had not submitted names of
exporters to SA, which they were required to do.
There are, however, problems that are likely to surface. There are
unconfirmed reports indicating that Zimbabwe does not fully comply with
FTA rules. Also, Zimbabwe and Malawi, which earlier had favourable non-
reciprocal trade agreements with South Africa, feel that the FTA will only
have negative effects for them. The FTA forces them to scale down their duties
on goods imported from South Africa, whereas their own exports to South
Africa are already duty free. The problem has been temporarily solved with a
quota arrangement for textiles, but some private sector quarters are still
mainly of the opinion that there is a good case for Malawi to withdraw from
the FTA.
According to the Trade Protocol, it is important to link trade measures with
industrial policy co-ordination. The recent Windhoek industry and trade
Ministers meeting reiterated the importance of the industrial sector in trade
and development and urged for acceleration of the process to formulate the
SADC Industrial Development Policy and Strategies. South Africa has been
particularly keen on establishing the trade-industry link through so called
“spatial development initiatives”.
At a more fundamental level, the differences in income and industrialisation
between the SADC countries present challenges for co-operation. There is a
danger that the least developed and least industrialised countries will benefit
less from trade liberalisation than the others.24 The trade protocol recognises
this asymmetry in that South Africa and the rest of SACU will reduce their
tariffs faster than the MMTZ and other SADC members. The problem arising
is that Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) are SACU
members and thus have a common external tariff with South Africa although
they are much less industrially developed than the bigger member. Some
progress has been made in allowing the BLNS countries greater access to
MMTZ markets than South Africa, through a commitment by the MMTZ to
accord improved market access to the BLNS, but the issue can hardly be
considered settled.
Some of the MMTZ feel that cuts in duty rates toward SACU may become
problematic. Mozambique has submitted proposals for the SADC Protocol on
Trade to allow LDCs to take temporary safeguard or remedial measures and
give technical and financial assistance free of charge to LDCs to address the
problem of costs that may arise from the dispute settlement process. This
matter is not yet resolved.
                                           
24 This is also evident in two recent trade studies commissioned by Norwegian embassies in Southern
Africa. See Overview of Malawi’s trade relations both regionally and internationally, Lilongwe:
Imani Development 2001(Unpublished report prepared for the Norwegian embassy, Lilongwe,
January 2001), and Economic Integration of the SADC Trade Protocol in Norad’s Assistance to the
Private Sector in Mozambique (Unpublished draft report, Nordic Consulting Group, 28 September
2001).
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As tariff barriers are progressively scaled down, it is likely that the problem of
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) will come to the fore. In June 2000 at Maseru, the
SADC Committee of Ministers of Trade reiterated its decision to eliminate
core non-tariff barriers (NTBs) relating to cumbersome procedures and
unnecessary measures which tended to impede intra-SADC trade. In the
context of NTBs the issues of co-operation and harmonisation in the area of
competition policy appear to be an increasing concern.
Competition regulation
The ongoing implementation of a SADC Free Trade Area and the process of
privatisation in the southern African region makes it important for Member
States to have policies and legal frameworks for the regulation of competition.
So far, only South Africa and Zimbabwe have fully-fledged competition
legislation. The Secretariat is keenly aware of this and feels that it is important
for Member States lacking such policies and frameworks to establish them. As
countries will have different needs and SADC is wary of being seen to
prescribe competition regulation for individual states, the activities so far have
focused on model legislation and consideration of regional aspects of
competition policy and legislation
Trade in services
A meeting in Mauritius in May 2001 made progress in the preparation of
further negotiations for liberalisation of trade in services and integration into
the multilateral trading system under GATS.  Substantial work has so far been
done in documenting relevant national legislation in line with agreed
information formats. This has included identification of Member States’
commitments under GATS. In the cases where SADC Member States have not
felt able to make GATS commitments the expectation is that they may make
commitments which are applicable to the region only.
EU relations
Negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) envisaged by the
Cotonou Agreement between the (African, Caribbean and Pacific) ACP states
and the EU are assumed to start in September 2002. EPAs will open the way
for free trade between EU and developing countries while complying with
WTO rules. In addition to the trade aspects, EPAs are likely to contain a
number of trade related aspects such as sanitary and phytosanitary rules,
standards and customs procedures as well as anti-dumping regulations. The
Cotonou principles governing the establishment of EPAs pay regard to
differences in development between the ACP states as well as regard for
individual countries’ development policy objectives and their integration at
both regional and global levels.
The 3rd Summit Meeting of the ACP in mid July 2002 in Fiji attempted to agree
to a common position on negotiating EPAs. The Summit endorsed a set of
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ACP Negotiating Guidelines that will be applied when negotiating EPAs with
the EU.
SADC will have to consider a number of difficult decisions about its stance in
EPA negotiations:
• How to ensure that key issues for SADC are considered favourably in the
ACP negotiations due to start in September 2002.
• How to handle the considerable differences between Member States in
terms of incomes and economic structures.
• How to handle the different and overlapping economic groupings in the
area
A simplistic approach to the creation of an EPA for Southern Africa would be
to think of extending the current EU-South Africa trade agreement. Because of
the very different needs of the other SADC Member States this would,
however, mean that the EU-SA agreement would have to be adjusted and most
probably renegotiated. Considering the time taken in negotiating the SA-EU
agreement, this would hardly amount to a shortcut route.
Looking at the various economic groupings in the Southern and Eastern
African region and their emerging strategies, we find firstly that SACU already
is a Customs Union and is likely to remain so. Secondly, both COMESA and
EAC aim at achieving a Customs Union by 2004. This means that in some two
years time there might be three different customs unions involving SADC
members. Because of the logical impossibility that Kenya, which is a member
of both EAC and COMESA, can have two different external tariffs, EAC and
COMESA will have to use the same Common External Tariff (CET), (or
Kenya will have to exit from either EAC or COMESA). SACU and COMESA-
EAC, each being fully fledged customs unions, might then independently
negotiate EPAs with the EU.
This would, however, leave (the non-SACU and non COMESA-ECA) Angola,
DRC, Mozambique and Seychelles outside any EPA25. The former three, being
classified as “Least Developed”, would still be able to benefit from a duty free
EU market under the EBA26 whereas Seychelles, according to the Cotonou
agreement, would remain with a much less favourable GSP arrangement. If no
EPA agreement succeeded, non-LDCs in SACU27or in COMESA-EAC28 would
end up with GSP schemes. Were such routes to be taken, it would also seem to
go against the Cotonou principle of supporting regional integration, as it
might present an obstacle for SADC on its way to a customs union.
                                           
25 Except for Mozambique, these countries are members of COMESA but still have not
accepted the plan to create a Customs Union by 2004.
26 Everything But Arms (EBA) is a unilateral concession from the EU, abolishing virtually all
import duties for the least developed countries. However it is not a legally binding agreement
as an EPA would be, does not address trade related issues and has more restrictive rules of
origin.
27 Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia
28 Egypt, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Seychelles
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To avoid scenarios like those set out above, one might consider the concept of
a greater eastern and southern African EPA, comprising both the present
SADC and COMESA-ECA. The viability of such a model depends firstly on
the will and ability of the participating countries and organisations to prepare
a common negotiation platform with the EU. Secondly, it would be important
for the greater EPA to pay due regard to the needs and characteristics of the
different countries and allow the integration process to differ between
countries or groups. This would perhaps be difficult in practice, but fully in
line with the Cotonou principles.
At this stage, one can only speculate on how and whether a greater EPA might
work. The likely prospect after 2004 would be that SACU and the COMESA-
EAC common market entered into an Eastern and Southern Africa FTA “en
bloc”, much in the same way as SACU now has entered the SADC FTA. The
non-customs-union countries29 would enter as individual countries. Were this
to happen it would amount to a quite dramatic transformation in the way
regional co-operation and integration is presently considered. The
COMESA/SADC countries would have to jointly conduct very complex
negotiations about the EU/EPA relations. One particular balancing act will be
to ensure that the scaling down of import duties vis-à-vis EU does not proceed
faster than it does inside the EPA, thus undercutting regional integration.
Analysts and observers in the region increasingly make mention of the
possibility of an acceleration in SADC’s development towards a Customs
Union. Although this certainly would solve a number of current problems in
relation to the rules of origin, and put SADC in a different position for the
future EPA negotiations, a rushed change of strategy towards a Customs
Union may also create new problems. The analysis of such intricate problems
as well as communication with political levels in each country will have to be
a major item on the SADC Secretariat’s agenda.
Memoranda of Understanding for “Macro-economic Convergence”
and “Co-operation in Taxation and Related Matters”
After an initial debate by the Council of Ministers, the Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) on “Co-operation in Taxation and Related Matters”
and “Macro-economic Convergence” were approved in June 2002. In August
2002 Finance Ministers signed the MOUs, which will provide a significant
input into the development of a SADC Finance and Investment Protocol30.
Both MOUs make reference to the forthcoming Protocol and the Member
Countries’ understanding that they will move towards the agreement of such a
protocol.
The two MOUs embody similar clauses for settlement of disputes,
amendment, revision and termination. The opt-out clause is simple: any
                                           
29 SADC countries outside SACU and COMESA countries not participating in the COMESA
Customs Union.
30 Communique from a Meeting of The SADC Committee of Ministers Responsible for
Finance and Investment held at Pretoria, South Africa, 8 August 2002.
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Member State may withdraw from the arrangement given six months notice.
The idea is to test the proposed arrangements “on the ground” in preparation
for an eventual protocol.
The MOU for macro economic convergence spells out an understanding of the
importance of macroeconomic stability for achieving SADC’s goals and
constructs a framework for surveillance of macroeconomic developments in
the Member States to achieve such stability. The focus is on four important
macroeconomic variables: inflation, fiscal deficit, public and publicly
guaranteed debt, and the current account of the balance of payments.
The procedure for surveillance is essentially a peer review system to be set up
by a Committee of Ministers for Finance and Investment. Member states will
present to the Committee of Ministers of Finance and Investment an annual
“convergence programme”. This will build on agreed indicators and include a
review of recent economic developments, progress relative to targets and the
setting of future targets for a three year period. The committee will evaluate
the convergence programmes submitted, determine whether they satisfy the
common guidelines, advise on changes and make recommendations.
The Committee of Ministers of Finance and Investment will be in charge of
the procedures. The institutional framework also includes a Committee of
Senior Treasury Officials, which is a technical advisory body to the ministerial
committee. The Committee of Ministers will also collaborate with a
Committee of Central Bank Governors.
It is believed that one sticking point during the deliberations that led to the
MOU was the role of the central banks. In most of the SADC nations, central
banks have a strong position in the implementation of monetary policy. The
role allotted to the Committee of Central Bank Governors by the MOU is
merely that of a Committee that the Finance Ministers’ Committee will have
to “collaborate with”. This appears not to reflect the high position of
governors in most SADC countries.
With the MOUs approved and signed, a key issue will now be implementa-
tion. Whereas a more elaborate structure for resolution of disputes was
initially contemplated, with the ultimate decision-maker being the SADC
Tribunal, the settlement-of-disputes clause in the final MOU simply says that
”Any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this MOU will
be settled through negotiation”.
The MOU gives the Committee of Senior Treasury Officials the task of taking
the initiative to establish “any structure that may be necessary to facilitate the
implementation of the MOU”. A monitoring and surveillance unit may be set
up, perhaps within TIFI, to assess programmes presented by Member States,
assist countries by co-ordination and preparation of regional projections,
monitor development, run a macroeconomic database, and prepare reports on
convergence programmes for the Council of Ministers.
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The need for such a unit to issue clear and sometimes unpopular judgements
would require a considerable degree of autonomy. Also, it would need to have
close relations with statistical offices in Member States as well as the statistical
branches with the Fund / Bank and preferably direct contact with the research
departments of Ministries of Finance.
It is likely that the SADC macro convergence process will build up slowly,
starting with fairly general assessments of the region’s prospects and national
policies and then progress to formal programmes. The “light” mechanisms of
enforcement are indicative of the differences in the economies of the region
and the member states’ different attitudes about the importance of
macroeconomic convergence.
The MOU on “Co-operation in taxation and other matters” sets the stage for
Member States to harmonise the tax regimes of the SADC region and to co-
operate in taxation matters. The preamble stresses the role of co-operation
and reduction of economic imbalances in management and performance and
prescribes co-operation in five different areas.
• Setting up a regional tax database which will describe tax rules,
incentives offered, tax treaties and a limited number of statistics of
revenue collection.
• Commitment to capacity building of tax officials and institutions and to
regional co-operation for such capacity building.
• Harmonisation of the application and treatment of tax incentives
including guidelines for such incentives and a fiscal framework for the
advancement of a SADC competition policy.
• In the area of direct taxes the focus is on treaties for the avoidance of
double taxation. This includes a common policy for negotiation of tax
treaties and a (future) comprehensive treaty network within SADC,
including the development of a SADC Model Tax Treaty as well as
mutual assistance, co-operation and exchange of information.
• In the area of indirect taxation there is an understanding to explore co-
operation for policy formation for excise duties on some specific
products, including tobacco, alcohol and fuel products in particular with
a view to reducing incentives for smuggling. Also prominent under this
item is the perceived need to harmonise VAT systems and, in line with
WTO agreements, the gradual substitution of taxes on international
Implementation and settlement mechanisms are simple. A Committee of
Ministers for Finance and Investment and the Committee of Senior Treasury
Officials are mentioned in connection with amendment and revision of the
MOU but their roles are not defined. Member States will merely “give
consideration to introducing mechanisms and procedures for the settlement of
tax disputes between Member States, including the establishment of a SADC
body for tax dispute settlement purposes”.
The MOU contains some very clear recommendations and measures and it
will be interesting to observe over time the extent to which individual
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countries comply. One may hardly expect rapid progress as long as
implementation mechanisms do not appear to have been considered.
The Taxation and Macro-convergence MOUs are expected, over time, to
become addenda which serve to specify the clauses of a more general and
legally binding Protocol on Finance and Investment. There are, however, (mid
2002) three additional MOUs that are meant to serve similar functions. These
are at various stages of preparation:
• An MOU on Investment is probably the one nearest to completion and
has been given a reading by stakeholders to be taken to the Council of
Ministers.
• An Insurance MOU has been provisionally agreed by a number of
countries
• A MOU on Development Finance Institution (DFIs) is perhaps the least
developed.
Also related to the area finance and investment, the SADC Central Banks are
working in four different fields:
• In the area of payment systems, the Central Banks have developed a
“Guide to Developing a Strategic Framework for Payment System
Modernisation”. The Guide is intended for the SADC members in the
region, but could provide best practice reference material for a country
which intends to develop, review and/or modernise its national payment
system, especially in the developing world.
• Work is ongoing in the area of Information Technology to develop the
capability of information technology functions in SADC central banks.
• A Subcommittee of the Committee of Central Bank Governors in SADC
on Exchange Control has been established to gather detailed information
on exchange control in SADC countries. The Subcommittee reviews and
rates countries according to their degrees of liberalisation and currency
convertibility and submits proposals on how to remove the remaining
exchange control related obstacles to the free movement of goods,
services and capital in the SADC region.
• Work is also ongoing in the area of Central Bank legal frameworks.
Although the final signature of the two MOUs does not appear to mark a
major breakthrough, it signifies considerable progress on one of the two most
important Protocols in the “new” SADC, the other being the Trade Protocol.
With these two protocols ratified and under implementation, the process of
integration will have taken a long step forward. To get there is, however, not
easy. No deadlines appear to have been set and progress may not be swift in
this area.
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Signature and ratification of protocols
SADC’s common policies and approaches are reflected by the Community’s
Protocols. A signed and ratified Protocol commits Member States to co-
operate, co-ordinate, harmonise and integrate policies and strategies in one or
more sectors. By 6 September 2002 there were 20 signed protocols and nine of
them ratified by at least two-thirds of the Member States. There was no
perceptible change from the situation a year ago.
1.8 Future Challenges of Restructuring
A key challenge for SADC’s restructuring process is to prove that the new style
organisation can be made to work and that it can deliver. The effort over the
last year shows a positive but mixed picture. On the one hand, the closure of
the SCUs and setting up of the Directorates at HQ in Gaborone has proceeded
quite well and nearly all National Committees have been formally established.
There is, however, some way to go before secretariat and SNCs are fully
functioning. On the other hand, while the RISDP process has moved forward,
it appears far from hitting the deadline. Also, there is a definite delay in the
planned study of SADC’s organisational structure which had, by June 2002,
not yet taken off.
Compared to the optimistic timetable of the Review of Operations Report the
restructuring effort has fallen behind. Since a catch-up is not likely, it seems
clear that the whole restructuring exercise is going to take longer than
originally planned. It is now believed that the completion of the whole
restructuring exercise will need at least another two years31. An important
implication of this is that seconded staff will be used longer and in greater
numbers than initially planned and will require additional funding.
The situation is not yet critical but if the new organisation is not functioning
by the end of another two years, there is a danger that fatigue may strike both
Member States and International Co-operating Partners. The organisation
may end up in a vicious circle: lack of delivery leading to lack of confidence
and lack of finance, which again restricts delivery capacity etc. etc.
The SADC protocols express the future directions for the organisation. As
pointed out above, progress on ratification / entry into force as well as
implementation has not moved forward perceptibly during the last year. In the
short run it is to be expected that the restructuring process will retard
implementation of the protocols. Still, SADC has achieved progress in a
number of areas. One may mention for example the ministerial decision
dealing with a major part of the rules of origin problem within the FTA. Also,
an early initiative was taken in relation to the emerging food crisis in the
region. Not least important, MOUs on Macroeconomic Convergence and Co-
operation in Taxation have been agreed and signed. A “mini” Donor
Conference has been arranged.
                                           
31 Norwegian Support to Restructuring of SADC Institutions. Project Progress Report. July
2002
C M I
27
Overall, the obvious challenge for SADC will be to consider the reasons for
delays and deal with them. However, reasons are complex and interwoven,
comprise a number of different levels and will thus be difficult to deal with.
The analysis below builds on a fair amount of speculation and guesses.
First, one should note that the various components of restructuring are linked
so that a delay in one of them tends to affect the progress of the others. For
example: Decisions on staffing should ideally not be taken before the study on
the organisation structure and the staffing of the Secretariat has been
undertaken. To conduct such a study it would, however, be necessary to be
clear about the priorities of the organisation. These priorities would be set out
in the RISDP which would therefore have to be completed before the start of
the structure study. The “Catch 22” is that the lack of staff holds back the
completion of RISDP which again holds back the structure study and therefore
the solution of the staffing problem.
It is possible to bring about a short run solution by undertaking short-term
recruitment. In fact, at the mini donor conference ICPs offered technical and
financial resources to enable the organisation to make temporary shortcuts.
These offers ought to be considered but SADC has not been generally
responsive to this.
Second, it appears that offers of assistance from ICPs to solve short-term
problems have not been accepted. Reasons for this could be lack of
administrative capacity and delays, which it is possible to deal with. It is,
however, also possible that it is due to a reason which it is more difficult to
deal with. SADC, which in the past was said to be “donor driven”, is now
overly concerned to avoid this syndrome. A much greater ICP input in terms
of finance and technical assistance may well put SADC in a position where it
becomes reactive, whereas ICPs in fact, by virtue of controlling the resources,
will get substantial influence over the direction of the organisation.
Third, it is fairly clear that the HQ staff of SADC is still small compared to
what it is expected to accomplish. Also, circumstantial evidence indicates that
the bureaucratic culture about to be adopted in the organisation is prone to
bureaucratic tactics of delay and avoidance of responsibility.
A fourth source of delayed action may be the character of interaction between
the governing structures and the Secretariat. The lines of power and
responsibility do not appear to be entirely clear. In some cases, the Council
has indicated a tendency to deal with relatively minor technical issues instead
of focusing on policy. There have been “snap” decisions by Council/ Summit,
handed down to the Secretariat, without allowing time for due consideration
of effects and side effects. One may hope for improvement if the ICM develops
an appropriate style of interaction with the Secretariat.
Fifth, the less than expected achievement of SADC may be due to constraints
and setting of priorities at the ministerial level. Ministers overwhelmed with
work may tend to give higher priority to national issues than to SADC. There
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will therefore be only very limited time to prepare positions on issues that are
on SADC’s agenda.
Sixth, there also appears to be little consultation between Member States in
order to build joint positions before meetings of the governing organs.
Positions may therefore be changed without much practical consideration and
circumspection, and decisions become vulnerable to sudden impulses and
politicking by perhaps only one or a few members.
Seventh, lack of a champion or a driving force for SADC may also be an
underlying reason for the slower than planned implementation of the
restructuring process. South Africa, as the giant of SADC, as also pointed out
in Ch 2 below, is not likely to take a strong position as a “driver”, perhaps
out of fear for being seen by the other Member States as a “bully”. The other
countries are perhaps too occupied with domestic problems to form any
strong group that may come forward as a driving force.
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2 Revitalising the SADC Organ? Prospects
for conflict management and security co-
operation
Southern Africa and its 180 million people suffer from a multitude of threats
to their security. Foundations may have been laid for peace in Angola, but
several countries still suffer from violent conflicts, which in turn threatens the
region’s stability. The situation has been aggravated by the destabilisation
caused by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and the current food shortages and
looming hunger in several countries. Poor and inadequate management of
these conflicts and security threats will have a potentially disastrous and
devastating impact on SADC’s efforts to promote regional co-operation and
integration. The need for peace and stability to ensure the achievement of the
region’s development objectives has been recognised in the SADC 1992
Treaty. The establishment of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and
Security in 1996 failed to move the organisation closer to a realisation of these
objectives. At SADC’s August 2001 Summit in Blantyre, however, SADC
adopted a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation and
reached important decisions to make the SADC Organ more firmly part of the
SADC structures. (Cf. CMI’s 2001 SADC report for a presentation.)
Will these decisions help revitalise the Organ and bring SADC forward in its
efforts to realise its Treaty objectives of promoting peace, security, democracy
and good governance? This chapter will first review the efforts to implement
and operationalise the 2001 decisions. It will then assess the organisation’s
efforts to deal with its current single biggest challenge – the crisis in
Zimbabwe. This will also include a discussion of the role of South Africa – the
main regional power within SADC. The chapter concludes with an assessment
and identification of key challenges.
2.1 Operationalising the SADC Organ
The Protocol signed by SADC Heads of State and Governments in August
2001 provides for a fairly elaborate structure of the Organ.32 It is led by a
Troika (composed of the current, outgoing and incoming Chair) reporting to
the SADC Summit. Under the Troika there is the Ministerial Committee
comprising SADC Ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public
security and state security. Under this Committee two ministerial
subcommittees are envisaged. First, an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy
Committee (ISPDC) is to be established comprising ministers responsible for
foreign affairs. The ISPDC shall perform such functions as may be necessary
to achieve the objectives of the Organ relating to politics and diplomacy.
                                           
32 SADC Protocols are in force when they have been ratified by two-thirds of the member countries.
The protocol on politics has been ratified by 5 countries per September 2002). The protocol is,
however, treated as if it has been ratified and the text itself has been published by the SADC
Secretariat in a separate leaflet.
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The second subcommittee is the well-established Inter-State Defence and
Security Committee (ISDSC) comprising the ministers responsible for defence,
public security (policing) and state security (intelligence). It has been in
existence for more than 20 years (until 1994 better known as the Frontline
States) and has a fairly elaborate substructure, especially under the Defence
subcommittee and a range of sub-sub committees in functional areas of co-
operation. Lesotho currently chairs it, with Angola set to take over in the
second half of 2002 . (One option to be decided is whether the country
chairing the Organ shall chair ISDSC.)
The Protocol also stipulates that the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone should
service the restructured Organ (previously the country chairing the Organ was
also supposed to provide the required secretariat services).
The Protocol also lists a number of policy objectives. They basically revolve
around collective security (preventing violent conflicts between each other);
collective defence (ally with each other in joint defence against external
threats); governance, democracy and human rights; development of common
foreign policy approaches in international fora; and building joint capacities in
areas such as peacekeeping, disaster management and co-ordination of
humanitarian assistance.
A number of related protocols – such as the Protocol against corruption, and
the Protocol on the control of firearms, ammunition and related materials –
outline similar principles, especially in the area of governance and collective
security. (See more on the corruption protocol in Ch. 4.) A mechanism to deal
with disputes arising between member states is also to be established following
the signing of the Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof.
Still, substantial work remains to be completed before these principles can be
operationalised and become an integral part of SADC’s efforts to promote
peace and security. Mozambique, elected the first Chair of the new SADC
Organ at the August 2001 Summit, has been in charge of operationalising it. A
number of steps have been taken over the last year. At the institutional level it
was decided in May 2002 to establish the ISPDC. According to the plans the
ISPDC shall have two subcommittees.33 One focuses on politics and
governance. This committee will address issues such as good governance,
human rights and the rule of law, corruption, etc. The second committee will
focus on diplomacy, addressing issues such as early warning and prevention of
violent conflict, conflict management and various global policy issues which
may require co-ordinated positions by SADC countries.
The precise role of the SADC Secretariat does not appear to have been
clarified. The Secretariat did in late 2001 prepare the terms of reference for the
hiring of staff to administratively service the Organ. The SADC Council of
Ministers at its meeting in June 2002 decided to let the Secretariat invite
                                           
33 The factual information on the planned structure and policy is based on a briefing to the team by
Defence and Foreign Affairs officials in Mozambique and especially South Africa.
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member countries to second personnel to fill two positions as political officials
servicing the Organ. A final staffing will await the study of SADC’s
organisational structure as well as further clarification of the needs of the
Organ. A key issue here will be an interpretation of what is implied by
“servicing”. It may be interpreted as simply providing basic administrative
assistance to the Organ, but it could also imply the establishment of a stronger
political unit with the Secretariat.
The Secretariat itself appears to play a peripheral role in the evolving
discussion of the institutional structure of the Organ. These issues are mainly
dealt with by the political Organ structures. The Secretariat does, however,
have one official working on related issues through SADC’s European Union-
funded “Special programmes” on small arms, drug trafficking and demining
(cf. CMI’s 2001 report). These special programmes are scheduled to be
included in the Directorate for Social and Human Development and Special
Programmes (SHDSP), but they may also more directly be related to the
planned unit servicing the Organ. In any case these programmes will have to
fit into the work of the Organ.
The planned organisational structure has been developed as part of a Strategic
Indicative Plan for the ISPDC. This plan and the proposed structure were
expected to be submitted to the SADC Summit for approval in the second half
of 2002.
Similar developments have taken place under the auspices of the ISDSC. A
Mutual Defence Pact has been drafted and is to be submitted to the SADC
Summit for consideration.34 Such a defence pact is, however, likely to be
difficult to implement. It usually requires greater supra-national authority
compared to a mere collective security arrangement and it presupposes a
willingness to supply mutual information on e.g. defence procurement which
in the end many member countries may be reluctant to do.
The ISDSC has witnessed setbacks on other fronts. The SADC Regional
Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) based in Harare has made significant
progress in becoming a more regionally owned institution with staff from
several SADC countries. Although nominally controlled by the Zimbabwe
Ministry of Defence it was increasingly recognised as a regional institution
reporting to the Defence substructures of the ISDSC. With the main donor
(Denmark) suddenly deciding in early 2002 to withdraw its funding, the
RPTC virtually ceased to offer training courses, bringing to a preliminary end
one of the identified priority tasks for the SADC Organ. The future of the
RPTC remains undecided at the time of writing, although Zimbabwe has
officially announced that the RPTC will continue to operate.
                                           
34 A first draft was submitted to the August 2002 Summit but it was then decided that further
consultations were required. This team has not consulted the last draft but was informed that it does
not deviate from the previous draft in any significant way. The Pact provides for mutual assistance in
case of external threats, but does not provide for assistance in cases of internal threats to state security
as some member states originally had called for.
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There has been notable progress within SADC in developing a common
approach to the Organ and its area of operation. This is significant
considering the political divisions and tensions within the organisation. One
may expect progress in building functional co-operation in a number of areas
under the auspices of the Organ. Significant work remains to be done in
relation to developing policies in the areas of operation. Among senior
officials in South Africa there was a clear expectation that this development
would reflect the advances and decisions reached under the auspices of
NEPAD and its efforts to develop an approach to governance, conflict
management and enforcement mechanisms (see also Ch. 3). One may also add
that important impulses towards the evolving policies of the Organ will come
from SADC’s efforts in other areas such as combating corruption and
promoting good governance in various other sectors. Likewise the work of
associated organisations such as the Parliamentary Forum (see below) and
non-governmental organisations will be important (see Ch. 4).
Principles and policies do not, however, easily translate into implementation
and politics. Practice may be entirely different, especially when there is a need
to use enforcement against unwilling groups or member countries. In assessing
the prospect of the SADC Organ we shall therefore take a close look at the
case of SADC and the crisis in Zimbabwe.
2.2 The Zimbabwe crisis, SADC and South Africa
SADC has had to confront a number of grave security problems threatening
the region’s stability and development. The wars in Angola and DRC, the
violent conflict and state collapse in Lesotho and most recently the deepening
crisis in Zimbabwe have all been addressed in different ways and in an ad hoc
manner by SADC and its members. This is not surprising. Lack of functioning
security architecture and established channels for managing conflicts in the
region also imply that such challenges will be tackled in different ways in each
specific case.35
The economic meltdown and deepening political crisis in Zimbabwe have
serious implications for its neighbours and the Southern African region.
Economically, Zimbabwe had the second (presently the third) largest economy
in the region; it plays a crucial role in linking most of the region’s energy and
transport systems and has traditionally been a breadbasket for southern
Africa. The further deterioration is likely to slow down the implementation of
the trade protocol and weaken the economic cohesion in the region.
Potentially, millions of Zimbabweans may also flee the country and take
refuge in neighbouring countries, further contributing to the destabilisation in
the region.
Politically, Zimbabwe is also in a deepening crisis with deteriorating
governance and growing mal-administration and lawlessness. There are no
                                           
35 Cf. Peter Meyns, “The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC Region: the re-
establishment of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security”, 24 pp., paper prepared for the
NEPRU Regional Integration Monitoring Workshop, Windhoek, 1-2 June 2002.
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prospects of peace and stability in the near-to-medium term. This has further
aggravated the economic crisis and Zimbabwe’s role in weakening the regional
project. Historically, Zimbabwe has played a formative and decisive role in
moving the regional project forward.
The other SADC member countries have recognised the crisis in Zimbabwe
and the issues have been raised with growing concern at several meetings of
the organisation. A number of initiatives have been taken to help reverse the
economic decline and political instability in that country.36 At the August
2001 Summit a task team lead by Malawi (the Chair of SADC) was assembled
to work with Zimbabwe. Led by the Malawi President, it travelled to Harare
on 11 September and came with fairly strong and public criticism of the
policies of the Mugabe regime. It called for specific steps to establish a
dialogue with the opposition and for the restoration of law and order. This
was a significant meeting. For the first time in SADC history SADC member
countries joined ranks in publicly critiquing another member country.
However, the September intervention failed to achieve the desired impact.
President Mugabe did not change his policies. SADC did not respond with any
counter measures or public criticism. Indeed the SADC response throughout
the slide towards increasing authoritarianism in Zimbabwe, and increasingly
as the country entered the election period, can be characterised as defensive
and ultimately a closing of the ranks. In the aftermath of the election the
SADC Council of Ministers declared the process to be free and fair. Although
some countries were clearly unhappy with the elections, most came out
strongly supportive of the electoral outcome, including the current and
incoming chair of the SADC Organ, Mozambique and Tanzania, as well as the
SADC Chair itself, Malawi. Many SADC countries also sent their own
observer missions and – as was the case of Malawi - made great efforts to
secure a composition of the team that would ensure a positive assessment of
the election.37
There was one important dissenting voice. The Windhoek-based SADC
Parliamentary Forum dispatched a strong observer mission to Zimbabwe
Presidential election. They concluded – in contrast to their rather weak report
from the 2000 parliamentary elections – that those elections failed to comply
with the criteria for free and fair elections. More particularly, they found that
the elections violated most of the SADC Norms and Standards for elections.38
                                           
36 See a good overview in Shannon Field, “When Neighbours Stray. Political implications for the
SADC Region of the situation in Zimbabwe”, pp 21, paper prepared for the HF Guggenheim
Foundation sponsored conference on Zimbabwe’s crisis and impact on the Southern African region,
London, 15-16 June 2002.
37 The information on Malawi is based on personal communications to the team from separate
sources.
38 The Norms and Standards are not legally binding. They are simply guidelines issued by the
Parliamentary Forum. Cf. SADC Parliamentary Forum, Norms and Standards for Elections in the
SADC Region. Recommendations adopted by the SADC Parliamentary Forum Plenary Assembly on
the 25th March 2001 Windhoek, Namibia, Windhoek: SADC Parliamentary Forum 2001. Their report
from Zimbabwe (unpublished when the team visited Windhoek in June) is available as Observation
Mission Report. Zimbabwe Presidential Elections 2002, n.p. (Windhoek): SADC Parliamentary
Forum 2002. The Parliamentary Forum is not formally part of the SADC structures, but the
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However, it should be added that only a narrow majority of the 36 member
mission supported this conclusion.39
It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that SADC has not sufficiently
pursued the issue of governance and human rights since it began to address the
worsening situation in Zimbabwe in 2000. Instead, it may be concluded that
the SADC “approach to Zimbabwe was guided more by the need to maintain
stability in the region, the desire on part of some to maintain the bonds of
solidarity between liberation movements, and to guard against the rise of
‘reactionary’ opposition parties”40
What then about South Africa? What role can that country play in pursuing
SADC’s commitment to peace and security, democracy and good governance?
South Africa has been clearly unhappy with the growing instability in
Zimbabwe. This seems to be particularly motivated by the economic impact
(Zimbabwe was South Africa’s most important export market in Africa, the
economic crisis there has affected investor confidence throughout the region;
and the situation in Zimbabwe has contributed to the fall in the value of the
South African Rand) but also fear of the consequences of the potential influx
of millions of Zimbabwean fleeing their country and taking refuge in South
Africa. Already, South Africa may have as many as between one and two
million illegal immigrants from that country.
In addition to these motivations South Africa was also concerned and
embarrassed by the poor governance and growing authoritarianism,
particularly as South Africa itself was developing criteria for good governance
through the NEPAD initiative (cf. Ch. 3). These political concerns were,
however, coupled with, on the one hand, a reluctance to accept the Zimbabwe
opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), preferring instead
to see changes coming through the ZANU-PF. This was a result of historical
loyalty and solidarity between former liberation movements (despite the fact
that the ties between the ANC and the ZANU-PF never had been particularly
close) reinforced by a growing fear within the ANC that MDC may become a
model for a joint business-labour opposition to the ruling parties in the region.
This was reinforced by what was seen as MDC’s shift to the right through
establishing dialogue with opposition parties such as the Democratic Alliance
in South Africa and Renamo in Mozambique.41
South Africa’s policies towards the Zimbabwe crisis must also be seen against
South Africa’s reluctance to pursue unilateral policies. It got its fingers burnt
when it called for sanctions against the Abacha regime in Nigeria in the 1996
and was deserted by other African countries. President Mandela’s critique of
the policies of the Zimbabwe government only contributed to what South
Africa perceived as isolation from the other countries in the region and to a
                                                                                                                          
organisation is likely to play an important role if SADC is to achieve its goal of becoming more
“owned” by the peoples of the region (see also Ch. 1)
39 Personal communication to the team by an anonymous but reliable source.
40 From p. 4 in S. Field op.cit.
41 These points are made inter alia in P. Bond: “Zimbabwe. Pretoria’s new African dilemma”,
Indicator South Africa, vol. 19, 2002, 1: 15-29
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stalemate in the operationalisation of the SADC Organ. President Mugabe
retains a strong popularity on the African continent. Mugabe may have a
strong opposition at home and he may have stolen the election but he is still
seen as a popular leader throughout the Southern African region and further
north on the African continent. He is regarded as a political leader standing up
against colonialism and imperialism. It was felt in Pretoria, and probably
rightly so, that any unilateral action could lead to the isolation of South Africa
and undermine its ambition to develop NEPAD and shape the African Union.
This provided the framework for the formulation and implementation of
South Africa’ policy towards Zimbabwe.42 The policy was characterised by
what South African leaders referred to as “quiet diplomacy”. South Africa has
been strongly opposed to any form of sanctions against Zimbabwe, even
taking the opposite position by instructing parastatals to provide goods and
services (e.g. electricity) in periods when Zimbabwe has been unable to
provide payment for their imports. On three occasions President Mbeki
criticised the regime in Zimbabwe in public. On one occasion, such a public
denunciation produced the desired result. In April 2001 South Africa protested
against war veterans’ invasions of South African businesses in Harare. The
next day the security police were sent in to end these violations.
South Africa preferred to work through the regime and was seen as
increasingly wanting to stay away from criticising the regime. This reached its
climax immediately after the election when the majority of the members of the
official South African observer team produced a statement supporting the
election by declaring it “legitimate”.43
Since then, South Africa has worked through the Commonwealth in
facilitating a dialogue between the two parties. It has also reportedly drawn up
a list of “moderates” within the ZANU-PF and is attempting to strengthen
their hand. The problem and the challenge for South Africa are that none of
these initiatives are producing the desired results and that the crisis is
deepening. The dialogue itself also deadlocked in mid-2002 with no solutions
in sight.
South Africa’s position seems to be guided by the wish to avoid making tough
unilateral decisions as well as to avoid actions that may hold the risk of
making the situation even more unstable and unpredictable. The problem for
South Africa is that SADC is not an organisation that will or can take the lead
in the short-to-medium term. The mechanisms to be established under NEPAD
and the African Union may only become operational some time in the future.
The situation in Zimbabwe may therefore worsen in the time to come, with
serious implications for Zimbabwe – and for regional co-operation.
                                           
42 See also a good background in Maxi Schoeman: “Objectives, Structures and Strategies: South
Africa’s Foreign Policy”, pp. 73-84 in South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2001/02,
Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs 2001. S. Field op.cit. provides a good
overview of South Africa’s evolving Zimbabwe policy.
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2.3 Future prospects
The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation is still far
away from the role envisaged for it in the SADC Treaty and in the new
Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. The Organ lacks
operational policies, financial resources and operational capacity. The
majority of SADC member countries have not even ratified the protocol. The
Organ, like the OAU mechanism on conflict prevention, will be further
handicapped with the strong - some would say obsessive - emphasis on
solidarity among member countries. Respect for sovereignty and independence
will seriously hinder attempts to confront conflicts over territories, human
rights abuses or authoritarianism.44 (Cf. also the discussion of NEPAD/AU in
Ch. 4.)
Despite these rather negative comments it must be emphasised that SADC has
made some bold attempts to address such issues and to establish procedures
and mechanisms for intervention. We are likely to see further progress along
these lines – under the auspices of the formal SADC institutions such as the
ISPDC or the ISDSC, from associated institutions such as the Parliamentary
Forum, from regional NGOs and regional networks, and from practices and
governance criteria emerging out of joint projects in a range of sectors.
Impulses and standards from outside the region will also increasingly impact
upon SADC’s work – such as demands and prescriptions from aid donors, and
from participation in multilateral co-operation such as the African Union and
NEPAD.
As long as national sovereignty remains unaffected – and it nominally will for
the foreseeable future – SADC as a multilateral body will impose itself
primarily in terms of common standards and practices. Those standards may
become increasingly strong and it will increasingly be more difficult and more
costly to deviate. In some cases we may see strong efforts by SADC or
individual member countries to assist countries in solving their problems and
lay the foundations for stability. The 1998 military intervention in Lesotho
was a disaster and probably violated international law as well, but the
subsequent political assistance by SADC to the tiny mountain kingdom was
particularly welcome and valuable. Led by South Africa, it helped mediate a
mechanism for negotiations between the political parties, negotiated a new
electoral law and provided technical assistance, which paved the way for a
successful general election in 2002. Important agreements of economic co-
operation have also been signed between Lesotho and South Africa.
The Lesotho case illustrates a typical trend. South Africa acts unilaterally and
at a later stage appropriate multilateral bodies such as SADC endorse it. The
military intervention was first referred to as a “SADC operation” in the
communiqué from the SADC Summit after the intervention.
                                           
44 See also A. van Nieuwkerk: “Conflict Management in Africa: Southern Africa’s experience with
security co-operation”, Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies (Harare) vol. 1, No 2: 23-46
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South Africa may not have been able to play the constructive role in
Zimbabwe as many outside observers hoped for, and its analysis may have
underestimated President Mugabe’s ability to resist “constructive
engagement”. This does not imply, as the case of Lesotho illustrates, that
South Africa is negligent of conflicts in the region. It has with increasing effort
asserted itself as a regional power and sought to facilitate conflict resolution
on the continent. This has most importantly included the Great Lakes region.
It has helped mediate a political settlement in Burundi and has deployed
military peacekeepers in that country.
In the DRC, South Africa has pursued a peace agenda since the fall of the
Mobuto regime. A first breakthrough came with the 1999 Lusaka Agreement
when the six countries fighting in Congo signed an agreement. That agreement
helped to dampen the conflict a little and officially launched internal
negotiations. The negotiations finally got going after the death of the DRC
President Laurent Kabila and were assisted by the official talks’ facilitator
Ketumile Masire, Botswana’s former president. These talks began in Sun City
in South Africa in February and when they failed to meet the April deadline,
President Mbeki intervened and a partial agreement was reached to form a
power-sharing transitional government. The agreement excluded the main
rebel group, backed by Rwanda and it was therefore clear that it could not
work. A major failure was that the agreement did not address an issue of
major concern to Rwanda: the Hutu militias and former members of old
Rwandan army who fled to Congo after the genocide. Mbeki therefore
decided to address the problem by bringing the DRC and Rwanda presidents
under his eye to thrash out an agreement. The two presidents eventually agree
to let South Africa, as chair of the AU together with the UN, constitute a third
party to supervise any agreement reached. An agreement was finally mediated
in July 2002. DRC agreed to round up and return Hutu rebels to Rwanda,
which agreed in turn to withdraw its troops once the third-party referees
(South Africa and the UN observer mission in DRC) had certified the Hutus
were under their control.
The agreement itself does not bring peace to DRC, the newest member of
SADC. There is a range of implementation problems (not least the dispatch of
a monitoring force with sufficient peace-enforcing mandate to verify the
disarming of the Hutu militias, the interahamwe). Despite these challenges the
agreement is significant – and it is an agreement made possible by South
Africa’s efforts.
However, South Africa’s capacity is limited. It already faces serious obstacles
in managing and implementing its policies in the complex conflicts where it
has become involved. It lacks sufficient senior officials with the required skills
to pursue this over extended periods of time. At the same time the experiences
so far have underlined the importance of working through multilateral and
intergovernmental bodies.
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3 SADC and Continental Development
Efforts: AU / NEPAD
As one of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs), SADC will play a
role both in the region and continentally through a number of links between
the various regional and continental organisations. Below, we set out, in some
detail, emerging changes in African co-operation, particularly focusing on AU
and NEPAD with a view to exploring consequences for SADC and its relations
with the rest of the African continent.
SADC is a Regional Economic Community (REC). Among the 10 RECs in
Africa that are fairly visible, at least two could be characterised as dormant.
The following five (including the two dormant ones) are regarded as “pillars”
or building blocs of the African Economic Community (AEC):
The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU);
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS);
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);
Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA);
Southern African Development Community (SADC).
In addition to RECs, the continent also has a number of functional
organisations with continental (or near continental) coverage, of which about
half are so-called specialised organisations, formerly under OAU, now the
African Union (AU).45
The future of these organisations under the AU is not entirely clear. Their
track records have in many cases been disappointing or nearly invisible. A
review of the Agencies to “determine their continued relevance” and to make
“concrete proposals on their possible incorporation as Specialised Agencies of
the AU” is under way.46
A number of Conventions, Charters and Declarations cover areas such as
“Human and Peoples Rights”, nature and natural resources, maritime
transport, nuclear free zone, research and development, information, refugees,
mercenary activities and terrorism. There is also a Cultural Charter for Africa.
A fourth category of agreements comprises those that focus African problems
but are either issued by non-African countries or signed by both African and
non-African countries. To this category belong the Africa Action Plan, which
is essentially the G8 answer to the NEPAD framework, the Genoa plan
(containing the first reaction of the G8 to NEPAD), the Africa Growth and
                                           
45 African Accounting Council; African Bureau for Educational Sciences; African Civil
Aviation Commission; Pan-African News Agency; Pan-African Postal Union; Pan-African
Railways Union; Pan-African Telecommunications Union; Supreme Council for Sports in
Africa.
46 AHG/Dec. 1 (XXXVII). Decision on the implementation of the Sirte summit decision on the
African Union.
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Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Africa-Europe Summit (Cairo Declaration and
Plan of Action), Beijing Declaration and Programme, and the Tokyo
declaration on African Development (TICAD).
3.1 From OAU to AU
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963, comprised by
2001 practically all African countries. It has for some time been widely
recognised that the organisation needed change. First, the need for greater
organisational efficiency had become very clear. Second, there has been an
emerging consensus that conflicts and undemocratic regimes constitute
important blockages to development and that it is one country’s right to be
concerned about the internal affairs of another. This has made it necessary to
reconsider the OAU principle of non-interference. Third, the criticism that
OAU has kept undemocratic and dictatorial heads of state in power has been
widely accepted.
Change was precipitated in 1991 by the signing of the declaration of the
African Economic Community (AEC). The new and ambitious social and
economic goals needed a different organisational structure than that of an
essentially political organisation such as OAU. Still, the OAU secretariat was
given to act as a secretariat for AEC.
A major step on the way to the AU was taken in 1999. At the OAU
Extraordinary Summit in Sirte, Libya, it was decided to “Establish an African
Union in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the charter of our
Continental Organisation and the provisions of the Treaty establishing the
African Economic Community”47.
The OAU /AEC summit in Lusaka 2001 advanced the planning of the African
Union further by mandating the Secretary General to work out details of the
procedures of the organs, set up the Economic Social and Cultural Council,
incorporate a mechanism for conflict prevention and management into the
Union (including the role of RECs), as well as consider the future role of
specialised agencies and technical committees. A transitional period of one
year (11 July 2001 to 10 July 2002) was agreed.
The AU Constitutive Act came into force on 9 July 2002. The inaugural
meetings were held in Durban, South Africa. The OAU's former General
Secretariat will, for an interim period of one year, serve as the AU
Commission.
The Act includes, as OAU did, reference to unity and solidarity, sovereignty,
territorial integrity and independence, but the focus has moved further, to
social and economic development and integration. The co-ordination of
existing and future RECs as a start of the gradual attainment of objectives of
the Union is underscored. The Act calls for the establishment of “necessary
                                           
47 Sirte Declaration. Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government. 8-9 September 1999, Sirte Libya. EAGH/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev. 1
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conditions that will enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global
economy and in international negotiations”.
The AU organisation
The supreme organ of the AU, as now set up, is the Assembly, which
comprises all Heads of State and Government. The Executive Council, which
will feed into the Assembly, is a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (or
other ministers dealing with the AU). The Permanent Representatives
Committee is set up at the Ambassadorial level and will work closely with the
Commission feeding into the Executive Council.
The Commission is the key administrative organ and will be headed by the
Chairperson of the AU, assisted by a Deputy Chairperson and Commissioners
as well as a secretariat. A number of Specialised Technical Committees will be
established under the Commission. They will be headed by the eight
commissioners for, respectively, Peace and Security; Political Affairs (including
Human Rights, Democracy, Good Governance); Infrastructure and Energy;
Social Affairs; Human Resources (incl. Science and Technology); Trade and
Industry; Rural Economy (incl. Agriculture); and Economic Affairs.
A Pan-African Parliament will, at least at the beginning, have advisory and
consultative powers and is not elaborated in the Constitutive Act.
AU is aimed at a much more extensive consultation and openness towards the
public than the OAU, which was based largely on state to state relationships.
The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) will provide for civil
society participation. Details for the set up of ECOSOCC are not yet entirely
clear.
The Constitutive Act also provides for a Court of Justice and a Protocol on its
statute, composition and functions. The exact form of the Court of Justice is
not yet clear. Similarly unclear are the financial institutions incorporated in
the Act: The African Bank, The African Monetary Fund and the African
Investment Bank. Rules and regulations for these institutions are to be defined
in protocols.
The Peace and Security Council of the AU would comprise 15 African
countries and have powers to deal with conflict and security issues under the
new African Union (AU). Not much is known about the council at the present
time.
The African Economic Community and the AU
The AEC treaty spells out the social, economic and other goals of the AU. It
also spells out roles and functions of AEC organs that are largely identical
with those in the AU Constitutive Act. The two parallel pieces of legislation
may, in certain respects, not be fully compatible or may contain contrary
provisions. Article 33, para. 2 of the Constitutive Act states that “The
provisions of this Act shall take precedence over and supersede any
inconsistent or contrary provisions of the Treaty establishing the African
Economic Community”.
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The goals and objectives in the AEC treaty cover a broad range of structural,
economic and social issues: The roles of the RECs (Chs IV and XIX) are
envisaged to be particularly important in the earlier stages of the
implementation of the AEC. On economic issues the Treaty calls for trade
liberalisation, freedom of movement for persons, rights of residence and
establishment and deals with money, finance and payments, food and
agriculture, industry, science, technology, natural resources and environment,
transport, communication and tourism as well as standardisation of
measurement systems. In the area of social affairs the Treaty comprises
education, training and culture, human resources, social affairs, health and
population and solidarity development.
Short term challenges for the AU
During the interim period of a year following the Durban meetings,
considerable attention will have to be paid to setting up the new organisation
and its secretariat48. Apart from building a viable and transparent Commission
to serve as the Secretariat of the African Union, arrangements are needed for
the new organs related to the AU, such as the NEPAD, the CSSDCA, the Peer
Review Mechanism and the Security Council. Also, the organisation will have
to change the character and extent of its relations to the civil society
organisations.
Another important issue is the financing of the new organisation. In the
optimistic mood of the Durban conference this perhaps seemed like a small
matter, but it should be remembered that a number of countries had not paid
their dues to the OAU. An Eminent Persons Advisory Panel that was
established in Lusaka in 2001 to assist the Secretary-General and advise him
on the way forward with the transition process called for the establishment of
an African Union Development Trust Fund (AUDTF). The panel felt that this
would help to generate and attract extra-budgetary resources to support
development projects49.
It is likely that the new organisation will start functioning beyond the formal
level of meetings and resolutions only considerable time after the interim
period. Although the official reactions from EU, the UK and China were very
supportive, the international press and observers have received the move from
OAU to AU with some commendation but considerable scepticism. The
sceptics, however, do not focus on formal faults and weaknesses in the goals
and organisational plans expressed in AU/AEC documents and agreements.
Critical remarks are rather based on the poor track record of the OAU which,
according to one, “had presided over 40 years of suffering”. Several
commented unfavourably on the fact that the Durban meetings did not cover
the pandemic of HIV/AIDS in any substantial way.
                                           
48 The Interim Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Mr. Amara Essy, on
Tuesday, 23 July 2002. AU Press Release No. 06/2002. “Interim Chairperson of the
Commission of AU Outlines his priorities”
49 African Union news service: http://www.africa-union.org/en/detail.asp?id=161
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A successful start for the AU?
The important role played by Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in the
transition has been interpreted as a negative factor not only by Western
commentators. It is likely that the Libyan leadership also gave rise to the
initial reluctance among African leaders. It is fairly widely assumed that Col.
Gaddafi paid outstanding dues to the OAU for certain countries in arrears and
thus built up support for the AU idea possibly with the intention of bringing
the HQ to Libya. The present support by African leaders perhaps indicates
that the AU is an idea whose time has come. The AU may be seen as an
attempt by the African leaders not to have the continent increasingly
marginalised among the economic and political blocs that are being built
internationally.
It should of course be noted as a success that over 50 heads of state came
together and managed to agree about such important and farsighted
objectives. Still, considering some of the more laudatory remarks and speeches
it is hard to escape the feeling that political and economic integration is looked
at as an event - not as a process.
AU/AEC is often said to have taken key features from the EU. One would be
well advised to remember the long and arduous way that the EU has gone over
some 50 years, although it started from a much better position than the AU.
The embryonic EU had e.g. only a fraction of the number of countries which
are now AU members, there was a leadership in the Bonn-Paris axis and a
competent and well-paid bureaucracy.50
On the “fringes” of the AU summit, the talks between President Joseph Kabila
of the DR Congo and his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame, could be seen
as an early success for the AU. (Cf. Ch. 2) Initiated at the Durban summit, the
talks led to the signing of an agreement between the two countries on 1
August 2002. The parties to the treaty acknowledged that the launch of the
African Union, among other things, presented a window of opportunity for
resolution. The two countries had been waging a war that killed two million
people.
It is not easy to predict how AU will develop. The cause of pan-africanism
seems to have taken a step forward through the transformation of the old
continental and predominantly political organisation OAU into an AU aimed
at economic integration and social development and with political and
economic unity as ultimate aims. Also, the move away from OAU’s
preoccupation with non-interference, presages a time when African states will
be able to criticise and discipline leaders that break rules of good governance.
Also, the new organisation has moved away from the “statism” that was
predominant during most of the OAU era and created an opening for civil
society and the private sector.
                                           
50 For an interesting attempt to draw lessons for AEC from the EU see: Olufemi A. Babarinde:
Analysing the Proposed African Economic Community: Lessons from the Experience of the
European Union. (Prepared for the Third ECSA – World Conference on the European Union
in a Changing World, Belgium, September 1996. http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/
babarinde.htm
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Even after the Durban meetings that agreed on a number of procedural
protocols for the governing bodies of AU, the specifics of running the
organisation are unclear. According to the European Commission in its official
reaction to the launching of the AU “the establishment of the AU will be a
highly complex process, requiring political courage, institutional innovation,
time and experimentation”.
The success of the AU will depend on mobilisation of political will,
organisational capacity and financial resources. Unfortunately, available
information does not support the case for a strong and quick takeoff for the
AU. There are signs of serious rifts at the political level, and the present
organisational capacity is low and apparently plagued by internal strife and
underpaid staff. On the financial side the organisation, which has inherited
considerable arrears from the OAU because of members’ non-payment, will
have to roughly double its annual budget to a number probably in the region
of USD 80 million.
Perhaps as important as capacity and finance, AU requires a plan for action,
clear priorities and a driving force. The question of whether or to what extent
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) may supply the
necessary dynamics to AU is dealt with in section 3.2 below.
3.2 Emergence of NEPAD
It is mistaken, as is often done, to regard the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) as a stand-alone initiative by the South African
President. The tabling of the NEPAD initiative at the inaugural AU sessions in
Durban in July 2002 was the result of a process of consultation between
several African leaders and organisations, prominently among them the
OAU/AU.
Starting at the 1999 September in Sirte the OAU Summit prevailed on
Presidents Mbeki, Bouteflika and Obasanjo to raise a number of issues of
concern to African leaders with key western organisations like the G8 and the
IFIs. The responses from these organisations served to supplement the African
views and came to be a strand of the thoughts constituting the Millennium
Africa Plan (MAP), which was presented in Sirte alongside President Abdolaye
Wade’s Omega plan.
The call from the Sirte Summit for a merger of MAP, Omega, the ECA’s
“New Global Compact with Africa” and other similar initiatives led to the
(then) New Africa Initiative, which in July 2001 the OAU Summit in Lusaka
adopted as “Africa’s principal agenda for Development,…,within the
institutional framework of the African Union”.
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What is NEPAD?
In the following short description of the content of the NEPAD document51 the
initiative is characterised as a “development programme placing Africa at the
apex of the global agenda, by:
· Creating an instrument for advancing a people-centered sustainable
development in Africa based on democratic values;
· Being premised on recognition that Africa has an abundance of natural
resources and people who have the capacity to be agents for change
and so holds the key to her own development; and
· Providing the common African platform from which to engage the rest
of the international community in a dynamic partnership that holds
real prospects for creating a better life for all.
The primary objective of NEPAD is to eradicate poverty in Africa and to place
African countries both individually and collectively on a path of sustainable
growth and development to thus halt the marginalisation of Africa in the
globalisation process. At the core of the NEPAD process is its African
ownership, which must be retained and strongly promoted, so as to meet the
legitimate aspirations of the African peoples. While the principle of
partnership with the rest of the world is equally vital to this process, such
partnership must be based on mutual respect, dignity, shared responsibility
and mutual accountability. The expected outcomes are:
· Economic growth and development and increased employment;
· Reduction in poverty and inequality;
· Diversification of productive activities;
· Enhanced international competitiveness and increased exports; and
· Increased African integration.
NEPAD is structured into three components:
· The first component provides the preconditions for sustainable
development, which are the Peace, Security, Democracy and Political
Governance Initiatives; the Economic and Corporate Governance
Initiative; and the sub-regional and regional approaches to
development.
· The second component provides the sectoral priorities, which include
bridging the infrastructure gap; the Human Resource Development
Initiative; the Agriculture Initiative; the Environment Initiative; the
Cultural Initiative and Science and Technology Platforms.
· The third component concerns the mobilisation of resources: the
Capital Flows Initiative and the Market Access Initiative.
NEPAD is a mandated initiative of the African Union…”52
                                           
51 The New Partnership For Africa’s Development (NEPAD) October 2001
52 Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa: New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD), http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/nepa274a.htm Updated: 27 May 2002 15:39:31
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NEPAD’s organisational set-up
The apex of NEPAD’s governing structure is the Heads of State and
Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) where originally 15 heads of
state had seats53 and were expected to meet 3 times a year. During the AU
Durban meetings the committee was extended by 5 (one from each region) to
20. There is as yet no official information about the new members but they are
widely expected to comprise Libya and Kenya.
The Steering Committee consists of personal representatives of the five
initiating heads of state (South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal, and Egypt).
The Committee develops terms of reference and oversees the Secretariat,
which is a small, full-time group accommodated at the Development Bank of
South Africa (DBSA) in Midrand, South Africa. In addition to work done by
the Secretariat itself, the organisation also outsources work.
There are five task teams led by representatives of the five founding members
states54:
• South Africa: Peace and Security, Democracy and Political Governance
Initiative
• Nigeria: Economic and Corporate Governance / Banking and Financial
Standards/Capital Flows Initiatives;
• Egypt: Market Access and Agriculture initiatives;
• Algeria: The Human Resources Development Initiative;
• Senegal: Infrastructure.
The NEPAD document points out the following programmes to be fast-
tracked in collaboration with the development partners:
• Communicable diseases: HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis
• Information and communications technology
• Debt reduction
• Market access
The African Peer Review Mechanism
An innovative feature of NEPAD is the African Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM). Its purpose is to foster the adoption of appropriate policies for
political stability, economic growth, development and integration. The policies
must conform to the agreed political economic and corporate governance
values set out in NEPAD’s Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic
and Corporate Governance. Participation is open to all AU members. No state
can be forced to submit to a review but a review may be called for by
“participating Heads of State and Government in a spirit of helpfulness to the
                                           
53 Seats on the HSIC were between representatives for North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia;
West Africa: Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and; Central Africa: Cameroon, Gabon, Sao Tome &
Principe; East Africa: Ethiopia, Mauritius and Rwanda; Southern Africa : South Africa,
Botswana and Mozambique.
54 The areas of Environment, Culture, Science and Technology Platforms do not appear to
have been allotted to a task team
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Government concerned”. A panel of eminent persons will conduct the review,
supported by a secretariat. A staged mechanism for the review is set up. The
process ends with consideration by “participating Heads of State and
Government” and tabling of reports in key regional and sub-regional
structures such as the Pan African Parliament, the African Commission on
Human and People’s Rights, the Peace and Security Council and the Economic
Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) of the AU. The expectation is that if
countries have got the APRM’s approval, this will have a positive effect on
their development potential as well as the external resource flow from ODA,
private investment and perhaps the degree of access to important western
markets.
Impact of NEPAD
NEPAD has been given high priority among countries in Southern Africa,
particularly South Africa. Since its start, the HSIC has seen through the
finalisation of the NEPAD document and the governing structure, including
establishment and financing of the secretariat. The African Peer Review
Mechanism, covering political governance as well as eight Codes and
Standards for Economic and Corporate Governance for Africa, has been
agreed upon. Much of HSIC’s activity has also been devoted to the area of
peace and security. Detailed implementation plans have been elaborated in
other priority areas such as agriculture, health, education, infrastructure,
market access, capital flows and capacity building. These are summarised in
the so-called Initial Action Plan which was submitted to the Durban African
Union Summit, together with the APRM and the Declaration on Democracy,
Political, Economic and Corporate Governance.
At an early stage it was found important to market and communicate the
NEPAD initiative intensively. The extensive communication activities of the
NEPAD HSIC, as well as the individual Heads of State and the
implementation of a strategic plan for marketing made the NEPAD acronym
known virtually the world over to the extent that it appeared to overshadow
e.g. organisations like SADC and AU/AEC. Indications are, however, that the
average African (perhaps with the exception of South Africans) hardly knew
what NEPAD was all about. This and the - allegedly - top-down way in which
the NEPAD framework was set up arose as a matter of concern some time
before the Durban Summit and the HSIC became concerned that there be a
strengthening of NEPAD’s outreach activities.
What is the relation between AU and NEPAD? Official statements, e.g. from
the Department of Foreign Affairs in South Africa, always emphasise the
strong links between the two, saying that NEPAD is an OAU/AU mandated
process55. It is also clear from the above that the processes of OAU reform and
the development of the NEPAD framework were simultaneous, with a number
of possible contact points and overlaps, both in terms of persons and
institutions. This close relation is, however, not expressed in the NEPAD
                                           
55 Department of Foreign Affairs SA website: NEPAD Background 3. International
Engagements with the NEPAD process. http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/nepad3.htm Updated: 11
March 2002 10:47:37
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document where the near absence of references to the AU/AEC system and
other continental organisations is rather remarkable. The document only
contains two references to the African Union. One merely points to AU’s
backing for the spread of democracy over the continent; the other simply
states that the heads of state promoting NEPAD will advise the AU on
appropriate mechanisms for its implementation. Apart from a NEPAD
commitment to report to the AU summit, the HSIC appears to be in complete
control.
So far, NEPAD remains a framework for action. It has hardly delivered
concrete results to any greater extent than any previous “Africa Plan”. It has,
however, conducted a considerable PR campaign and raised the profile of
Africa on the international agenda. It has managed to factor NEPAD into the
outcomes of international conferences such as the conference of Financing
Development (FfD), World Summit for Sustainable Development WSSD, and
the WTO. In addition, it has been subjected, with some success, to two
important tests: a presentation to the G8 at Kananaskis, Canada and the
acceptance of the AU at its inaugural meeting in Durban.
Two important tests for NEPAD
At Kananaskis, the G8 put forward an “Africa Plan”56 which was a partial
answer to the statement in the NEPAD document on ”responsibilities and
obligations of the developed countries and multilateral institutions”. In a
statement at the end of the meeting the four African Presidents57 commented
on the release of the plan. They “welcomed the release of the Africa Action
Plan, as an initial reaction sufficient to kick-start the implementation of
NEPAD and noted that these actions would need to be upgraded and further
elaborated as the partnership progresses, in order to fully address the many
challenges facing the African continent”.
The Africa Plan accepted what is widely seen as a central bargaining point of
NEPAD, namely that of greater resource flows (including ODA) to Africa in
exchange for the maintenance of certain governance and democracy standards.
Several of the central requirements of NEPAD were accepted, although in a
somewhat conditional manner and not at the scale suggested by the NEPAD
document. This was the case for areas like peace and security, institutions and
governance, market access, agriculture, knowledge and education, and health.
In three main respects the G8 Plan, however, clearly deviated from NEPAD.
Firstly, the G8 took a “wait and see” attitude, assuming that improvements in
governance and democratic development would precede the increased resource
flow, whereas the NEPAD document appears to assume that improvements in
governance and greater resource flows will take place simultaneously.
Secondly, in terms of ODA and debt relief, increased resource flows indicated
by the G8 were both much more limited than the needs pointed out by
NEPAD, and more conditional.
                                           
56 G8 Africa Action Plan. Kananaski Summit Website. http://www.g8.gc.ca/kan_docs/
afraction-e.asp
57 Bouteflika, Mbeki, Obasanjo, Wade
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Thirdly, whereas the G8 leaves support for NEPAD to individual action by its
member countries, NEPAD tends to see support coming from a G8 “pool”.
For instance, with regard to ODA transfers, NEPAD points out the
importance of negotiating a “new relationship” with the development
partners. This relationship would avoid the present situation where each
recipient country has to deal with a multitude of donors even for one and the
same supported project.
NEPAD argues that the point of departure for increased aid must be “country
programmes” whereas the G8 state that they “will pursue this Action Plan in
our individual and collective capacities, and through the international
institutions to which we belong”. In the Plan’s section on ODA, the G8 point
out that “each of us will decide, in accordance with our respective priorities
and procedures how we will allocate the additional money we have pledged”58.
Whereas the NEPAD tends to see its programme as a communal one, the
message from G8 is that the type and extent of support to NEPAD will be a
matter for the individual donors to decide.
Among the components of NEPAD there were two important areas which
were noticeably not supported by the G8. NEPAD had made debt relief an
important point, envisaging a process where the NEPAD leaders would
negotiate a new and better deal with the creditors. The G8 plan generally
states that good management and HIPC will be sufficient. Beyond this,
promises given were basically “on a case by case basis”, conditional on
adherence to good government standards.
Another key element of NEPAD is its infrastructure programme, which
possibly was more extensively elaborated than any of the other programmes,
and included proposals for development of concrete infrastructure investment
projects. (See Annex Table 3). The Africa Plan59 merely promised to facilitate
“capacity-building and the transfer of expertise for the development of
infrastructure projects, with particular attention to regional initiatives”.
One area stressed more strongly by the G8 Africa Plan than by NEPAD is
health, including prominently HIV/AIDS. The G8 says that “…HIV/AIDS
affects all aspects of Africa’s future development and should therefore be a
factor in all aspects of our support to Africa, …”. NEPAD says very little
about the fight against AIDS. This is often connected to the centrality of
President Mbeki in the NEPAD process60 and his views on HIV/AIDS. While
HIV/AIDS is mentioned as one of the communicable diseases in the NEPAD
document, its dramatic social and economic consequences are not highlighted.
However, the NEPAD Document’s chapter on implementation makes it clear
that communicable diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, are
among the four areas where programmes will be fast-tracked61.
                                           
58 Para 10, G8 Africa Action Plan, Kananaskis Summit, Kananaskis Canada, 2002
59 Section 3.2, G8 Africa Action Plan, Kananaskis Summit, Kananaskis Canada, 2002
60 See for example Alex De Waal’s excellent overview of NEPAD: What’s new in the ‘New
Partnership for Africa’s Development’? International Affairs 78, 3(2002) pp 463-75
61 The other areas being ICT, Debt reduction and Market access
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At the Durban OAU/AU summit NEPAD was by and large accepted as the
strategic policy framework to drive the AU/AEC agenda. In its in tribute to
the Organisation of African Unity on the occasion of the launching of the
African Union, the AU announced its rededication to NEPAD. The AU
stressed “NEPAD as a programme of the African Union for strengthening
inter-African co-operation and integration in a globalising world and to
overcome the prevalence of poverty and strive for a better quality of life for
all the peoples of Africa”. 62 The Declaration on the implementation of
NEPAD at the first ordinary session of the AU63 endorsed the Progress Report
and the Initial Action Plan but also included an indication that Member States
could submit written comments to the HSIC chairman. Member states were
also encouraged to adopt the declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic
and Corporate Governance and to accede to the African Peer Review
Mechanism.
After the Summit, it is therefore clear that NEPAD, in principle, is seen as a
framework or programme within the AU. Apart from the fact that the
Assembly of the African Union is the ultimate governance structure of
NEPAD, there is, however, little information about the integration of NEPAD
into the AU structures. It was decided that the HSIC and the Steering
Committee would continue elaboration of NEPAD and implementation of the
Initial Plan at least until it would be reviewed at the 2003 summit in Maputo.
It therefore appears certain that the NEPAD Secretariat will exist
independently, outside AU, at least for another year.
However, the Durban meetings were not all smooth sailing for NEPAD.
Firstly, observers at the Durban Summit64 indicate that the status of NEPAD as
a kind of “ideological backbone” for the AU is not quite agreed. It appears
rather to be the manifesto of a reformist group led by Presidents Mbeki,
Obasanjo and Wade, which is opposed by leaders such as Mugabe and
Gaddafi. Presumably to counterbalance the impression of the NEPAD group
as an exclusive club, the Durban AU Assembly expanded the 15 member
Implementation Committee by five countries, one for each REC. No decision
was taken about names of individual additional participants in the group, but
the names of members like Gaddafi and Kenya’s President Daniel arap Moi
have been mentioned. Observers suggest that the additional five countries will
participate on a rotational basis.
Secondly, after the Summit it is less clear than before how the NEPAD peer
review mechanism will be run. A communiqué from NEPAD’s Implementation
Committee meeting before the Durban Summit indicated that the Peer Review
Mechanism would be run by an “outside” organisation like the ECA.
However, President Obasanjo, who is the Chairperson of the HSIC, went to
                                           
62 An earlier version used slightly different language: “…and which is also a response to the
need to reposition Africa in a globalising world and to overcome the prevalence of poverty
and strive for a better quality of life for all the peoples of Africa.”
63 Declaration on the Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD). ASS/AU/Decl. 1 (I)
64 See for example Africa Confidential, Vol 43 No 14 12 July 2002
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great lengths in stressing that the Nigerian commitment to NEPAD would not
be at the expense of the Conference of Security, Stability, Development and
Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) and the need to harmonise the two
initiatives.65
The CSSDCA predates NEPAD and has been accepted by the OAU summit as
a complement to the activities of OAU/AEC. It could be seen as an African
version of the European Organisation of Security and Co-operation (OSCE)
and has functioned as a policy development forum for the OAU/AEC. It is,
however, governed by a memorandum of understanding that contains a
monitoring and evaluation mechanism. The AU Assembly expressed a positive
attitude to the CSSDCA and accepted the integration of a CSSDCA unit into
the Commission. If the “monitoring and evaluation mechanism” of CSSDCA
was seen to duplicate NEPAD’s Peer Review Mechanism, it would be logical
to harmonise or integrate the two mechanisms. Since it is clear that the
NEPAD structures in the longer run will be pulled in under the AU umbrella,
the integration of NEPAD and CSSDCA should take place inside the AU
system. This would mean that NEPAD peer reviews would be conducted by
the African Union structures and not by an “outside” organisation.
Even with the above points of disagreement, the AU summit is mostly
considered a victory for the African leaders that stand for reform. The broad
acceptance of NEPAD and the Peer Review Mechanism in addition to the
move away from OAU’s non-intervention regime bode well for the future.
Section 3.3 below considers SADC’s relations to the two continental
initiatives.
3.3 SADC’s relation to AU and NEPAD
As a regional economic community SADC is part of a larger network of
African continental initiatives and organisations of which the most important
are likely to be the AU/AEC/NEPAD. Formally, both the AU Constitutive Act
and the AEC Treaty are fairly clear that RECs form building blocks for the
future continental economic community. This view is reflected in the SADC
governing organs as interpreted by the South African Department of Foreign
Affairs66
Formal relations between NEPAD/ AU/ SADC
“The linkage between NEPAD and the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic
Development Plan (RISDP) was adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
and Finance at their meeting in Blantyre on 13 September 2001, which came
to the conclusion that, in terms of relationships, SADC is part of and feeds
into NEPAD, which is premised on the regional economic communities
(RECs). The Ministers recognised that NEPAD is a framework and process
within the Union (AU), while SADC is a recognised REC of the Union. SADC
                                           
65 The OAU/AU meetings in Durban: A Summary and Interpretation. Jakkie Cilliers, Institute
for Security Studies, South Africa. ISS website http://www.iss.co.za
66 South African Department of Foreign Affairs. New partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD), http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/nepa275a.htm. Updated 27 May 2002 15:39:31
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participates, therefore, in both the Union and NEPAD. To this end, by
strengthening the implementation capacity of SADC, it was recognised that
success in NEPAD would be enhanced. It was decided that the development of
the RISDP and the SADC restructuring process should take NEPAD into
account, and where appropriate, SADC and NEPAD programmes should be
harmonised. SADC should also take NEPAD into account in the ongoing
review of SADC programmes.”
The NEPAD document67 reflects the view that the five68 sub-regional economic
groupings on the continent must be strengthened as pooling of resources is
necessary to improve international competitiveness. Capacity building to
enhance the effectiveness of regional structures and organisations is seen as a
priority. NEPAD also aims to identify common projects compatible with
integrated country and regional development programmes and to encourage
the harmonisation of economic and investment policies and practices.
NEPAD’s sectoral priorities for action at the regional level will be
infrastructure (especially ICT and Energy), human resources, health,
agriculture and access to the markets of developed countries. It is also
indicated that “regional and sub-regional institutions” will play an important
role under the Peace and Security initiative69. NEPAD also gives regional
organisations some more specific sectoral roles, such as the establishment of
regional regulatory associations, promotion of partnerships within tourism
and needs-analysis.
SADC is mentioned a number of times in the NEPAD document. It is
suggested that the SADC biomass energy conservation programme be
broadened to cover the rest of the continent. It is suggested that multipurpose
water resource projects such as the SADC Water Secretariat’s investigation of
the utilisation of the Congo River and the Nile Basin Initiative be accelerated.
Also, the relation between RETOSA and SADC is pointed out as worthy of
emulation by other RECs.
The African Union and RECs
In the AEC treaty, regional organisations are referred to as Regional Economic
Communities (RECs). Three of the AEC pillars, ECOWAS, COMESA, SADC
and in addition IGAD, in 1998 signed a protocol with the AEC. ECCAS
signed the Protocol in October 1999. AMU is yet to sign. The protocol serves
as a framework for co-operation, programme harmonisation and co-
ordination among the RECs and between them and AEC. The RECs have
raised a number of issues relating to their dealings with the AEC, as for
example the role, responsibility and capacity of the AEC as the apex
organisation vis a vis RECs and facilitation of contacts as well as formal and
ad hoc consultations between the AEC and RECs. Also the placement of the
ECA Sub-regional Development Centres have been taken up. The RECs were
                                           
67 Section on “Sub-regional and regional approaches to Development”
68 Probably referring to the “pillars” appointed by the AEC
69 Such as Prevention, management and resolution of conflict; Peacemaking, peacekeeping and
peace enforcement; Post-conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction; and
Combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines.
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requested to comment on the restructuring of the OAU/AEC secretariat, but
few responded.
The AU Constitutive Act makes mention of RECs only in terms of the overall
objective of promoting the “integration of African economies” and, more
specifically, to “co-ordinate and harmonise policies between existing and
future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the
objectives of the Union”.
The AEC treaty sees (in Articles 28 and 88) the RECs as building blocs for the
Community. They should be strengthened during the early period and then be
progressively integrated into the Community through co-ordination and
harmonisation. It appears that for AEC the raison d’etre for the RECs is their
contribution to the formation of the continental grouping which at a later
stage will take over co-ordination, harmonisation and evaluation of REC
activities – not so much the individual REC’s activities. The treaty states that
member states will further the integration of their respective economic
communities into the AEC.
Article 18 of the protocol on the Pan African Parliament determines that the
parliament shall work in close co-operation with “Parliaments” of RECs and
the possibility of consultative fora between RECs and the Parliament is
mentioned.
Representation of RECs in NEPAD and AU/AEC
The members of both NEPAD and AU/AEC are states and not regional
organisations. Whereas NEPAD does not offer an explicit view of the fate of
the RECs in the longer term, the vision of the AEC is clearly that RECs are
building blocks which will eventually be part of the African Economic
Community. However, the proposed strengthening of the RECs certainly
carries the possibility that perhaps the more successful RECs will not consider
an integration into a continental organisation with a number of poor and
mismanaged RECs as advantageous. The danger of regional fission in stead of
fusion is certainly the reason for the clear messages of the AEC treaty that
member states should push for the Community through their RECs.
SADC is represented at high levels in both NEPAD and AU. In NEPAD, the
region is represented by the four presidents who sit on the HSIC. There will,
however, be no formal representation from the organisation itself. In the AU,
SADC will be represented through its Heads of State at the AU summit. Also,
each of the RECs will be entitled to two Commissioners who will represent the
region. However, the nomination of candidates from the region, who will be
finally selected by the AU Executive Council and Assembly, will not be
undertaken by the RECs but by a panel of two Ministers from each region.
Regional and Continental - Complementary or Competitive?
The relation between AU and NEPAD should ideally be complementary, like
that of a programme to an organisation. The programme (NEPAD) determines
steps that have to be taken in order to reach certain goals, while the
organisation (AU) implements.
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Whether the actual outcome will be in line with this appears somewhat
uncertain. On the NEPAD side there exists a sense of urgency to start
implementation of the Initial Action Plan70 and there will be, at least for
another year, a small but relatively efficient administrative structure with good
links to a number of international organisations.
The AU/AEC, on its side, has the daunting and time-consuming task of
reforming the OAU secretariat into an efficient implementation machine. This
would point to either considerable delays in implementation or extensive use
of the NEPAD structures to move forward rapidly. The chance of overlaps
and perhaps rivalries would, however, be small since President Mbeki is both
a prominent member of the NEPAD HSIC and, until the Maputo Summit in
2003, the Chairperson of the AU Assembly.
What one may surmise is a growing tension between two alternatives. On the
one hand, there is a need for an early start of NEPAD implementation,
showing, as is politically necessary, that NEPAD can deliver. On the other
hand, there is the necessity of an orderly and, in all likelihood, lengthy,
bureaucratic process of setting up an implementation mechanism within the
AU. Such a tension may possibly exacerbate the rift between AU reformists
and traditionalists.
The relations between SADC and the continental organisations will for some
time be affected by the unsettled organisational structures. Even though the
AU/AEC ideally would be built on the RECs, it is not likely that the AU can
do more than mildly encourage regional organisations, basically leaving them
to their own devices. The RECs, save two or three, are likely to be too weak,
and too preoccupied with their own affairs, to have much influence on the
continental organisations. NEPAD, having a clear and fairly efficient
governance structure,71 would presumably have more active relations with
RECs in the short term. This would in particular be the case for SADC, which
is a relatively well run regional community and includes South Africa, which
has been very prominent in the NEPAD initiative.
It has been argued that SADC’s regional strategy (RISDP), which is now under
construction, creates a good opportunity for aligning a REC with the
continental strategy set out by NEPAD. If one takes a positive view of both
SADC and NEPAD it seems reasonable that consultation and exchange of
information between the two would have a positive effect on both
organisations’ chance for success. Examples may be the references to
interesting SADC activities in the NEPAD document quoted above.
However, it is important that communication and relations are balanced and
two-way. It is noticeable that despite formal statements there is a feeling
among some SADC members, and indeed observers, that NEPAD acts in a
                                           
70 This was even stressed by the AU Assembly mandating NEPAD HSIC to “ensure the
implementation” of the Initial Action Plan” ASS/AU/Decl 1(I)
71 Although the extension of the HSIC from 15 to 20 may blunt the organisation’s efficiency
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top-down manner. The June 2002 SADC Council of Ministers agreement that
the Secretariat should participate in NEPAD secretariat meetings and that
member states should appoint national contact points for NEPAD72 are
indicative of an intention to improve this situation.
NEPAD has taken great strides in heightening the profile of Africa in media
and international organisations. In particular, the link to G8 is an exceptional
achievement. The idea is certainly to use the higher profile and high level
influence, among other things, as a lever for channelling more resources
towards key African problems. The debt situation, where it appears to be
NEPAD’s intention to negotiate a better deal for debt relief, and its
infrastructure programme, are cases in point.
The list of NEPAD projects in Annex Table 3 shows that a number of them
take place within SADC or between countries in SADC and other RECs73. If
continental and regional organisations have different priorities it may lead to
disputes between the two. Comments from the SADC Council of Ministers on
proposed NEPAD projects are said to have been less than welcoming. If
NEPAD wants to have the full support of RECs and member countries it will
be necessary to reconsider the workings of present top-down decision-making
mechanisms. A majority74 of the NEPAD projects for which we have
information seem, however, to be in line with SADC projects.
There may also be need for co-ordination of peer review mechanisms. The
review mechanisms under the SADC macroeconomic MOU have clear
overlaps with some of the aspects of the broader NEPAD APRM.
Good governance and the contamination effect
The emerging consensus that good governance is necessary for development
have made AU and in particular NEPAD include good governance as central
parts of their objectives. Development partners have made good governance a
central issue for their decisions on allocation of resources and thus introduced
a considerable extent of what one may call “governance conditionality”.
Governance conditionality may have problematic consequences when applied
to multi-country organisations. The strong emphasis of NEPAD on
governance can, when encountering such cases of non-compliance as
witnessed in Zimbabwe, have “contamination” effects. Misbehaviour will
leave a negative impression on the outside world and therefore a negative
effect on the goodwill of donors, not only for the country itself but, by
                                           
72“to ensure proper institutional co-ordination with the NEPAD secretariat”
73 Examples are (see Annex Table 5): Mozambique - Malawi Power Interconnection; Study of
the DRC – Angola – Namibia Interconnection; Support for the Development and
Implementation of National Water Sector Policies and Strategies in SADC; Water Resource
assessment in SADC; Rehabilitation of Nacala Pots in support of concessioning; Lobito port
rehabilitation and transhipment facilities; Rehabilitation of Tanzania and Nacala Corridor
railways; SADC Regional Infrastructure Initiative (SRII). In addition come a number of
projects covering the whole continent and all RECs.
74 All four projects in the Water and Energy sectors
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association, for the entire regional and /or continental organisation to which
the country belongs.
The G8 plan for NEPAD stresses that it is the countries “whose performance
reflects the NEPAD commitments” that will be those getting the advantages
from the G8. Will such a case by case approach make it difficult for SADC as
an organisation to benefit from G8 resources? The paradox is that the
stronger integration is, the greater the contamination effect. If countries, on
the other hand, are considered individually, as the G8 plan appears to do,
NEPAD / G8 might work contrary to regional integration.
Although clearly steps in the right direction have been made with regard to
African integration, the change from OAU to AU and the emergence of
NEPAD is not likely to affect SADC very substantially for some years to come.
The present low level of organisational strength on the side of both the
continental initiatives and the fact that SADC will be under restructuring for
some time to come means that links will not be very active.
The formal representation of RECs has been integrated in the governance
systems of both the AU and NEPAD, but has not yet been formulated in great
detail and tested out. Issues like the handling of any gains from the NEPAD
G8 Africa Action Plan and harmonisation of the various peer review
mechanisms may be the first concrete areas where relations between
continental initiatives and RECs will be given the test of reality.
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4 Making SADC work? The role of non-state
actors in regional co-operation
SADC is a multilateral, intergovernmental organisation. It has, however,
always made provision for establishing working relations with actors and
organisations outside officialdom. An NGO liaison desk was established in the
early 1980s. Through the Sector Co-ordinating Unit on Employment and
Labour (led by Zambia), trade unions and employers’ organisations were
brought in, creating a de facto tripartite model in addressing these issues. The
1992 SADC Treaty emphasised that
“In pursuance of the objectives of this Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve
fully, the peoples of the region and Non-governmental Organisations in the
process of regional integration … SADC shall cooperate with, and support the
initiatives of the peoples of the region and Non-Governmental Organisations,
contributing to the objectives of this Treaty in the areas of cooperation in
order to foster closer relations among the communities, associations and
peoples of the Region”75
The current restructuring of SADC has made several attempts to formalise
links and relationships with non-state actors, most extensively through the
planned establishment of national committees in each member country, but
also through the agreements with regional associations and attempts to
involve non-state actors in areas such as the implementation of the trade
protocol (Cf. Ch. 1).
Beyond these more organisational dimensions it has also been long recognised
that actors outside SADC structures play an important role in promoting or
weakening co-operation in the subregion. This includes the private sector and
the business sector, civil society networks and co-operation, as well as
movements of people and migration across borders.76
This chapter will focus on the role of non-state or civil society in regional co-
operation. It will provide an overview of civil society in the region and assess
its profile and role in relation to SADC and in relation to regional co-
operation.
                                           
75 This is the text from the original SADC Treaty. It is retained in article 23 in the amended 2001
Treaty although the term “non-governmental organisation” is replaced by “key stakeholders”. In an
explanatory note is it stated that “key stakeholders” include “private sector, civil society, non-
governmental organisations and workers and employers organisations”.
76 This is well captured in B. Odén: “South Africa in Southern Africa: Revisiting the dynamo-
albatross debate”, pp. 116-142 in L. Thompson (eds.): Development, Democracy and Aid in Southern
Africa, Bellville: CSAS, University of the Western Cape 2000. He introduces the distinction between
Southern Africa of the market, Southern Africa of the people, and Southern Africa of the states.
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4.1 A regional civil society – an overview
There is no proper quantitative survey and overview of the voluntary sector,
non-governmental organisations, or civil society in the region. Nor are there
any clear commonly agreed definitions of what the term implies. For our
purpose it is sufficient to say that we focus on the range of formal and
informal organisations and associations that operate in the space between the
family and the state. They are not controlled by the state and they primarily
operate on a not-for-profit basis. This will include a vast and diverse set of
organisations, associations, networks, movements and groups. They vary
widely in structure, governance, formality and the scale and scope of their
operations and revenue.
The SADC Council of Ministers did appoint a committee in 1998 to assess
NGOs in the SADC region. Its October 1999 report is a good departure point
for an assessment.77 Based on a questionnaire distributed to national NGO
umbrella bodies and networks it concluded that the SADC region may have
over 17 000 NGOs, of which more than 10 000 are South African. It is
difficult to assess the accuracy of this figure. The team did, in connection with
the preparation of this and last year’s report on SADC, interview NGO
umbrella bodies in half of SADC member countries.78 The figures tended to
correspond (with some adjustments), but it has to be noted that the criteria for
being counted vary widely. In some countries foreign and international NGOs
are included (e.g. in Mozambique where a significant proportion of the
members of the NGO umbrella body are foreign NGOs), the extent of
inclusion of localised and community based organisations is uneven, and in all
countries many of those that are included are very weak and in some cases
even non-existent. Generally, employers’ organisations, trade unions and the
churches are also excluded from the survey.
The study reveals a number of very clear trends. In almost all countries the
NGOs are highly dependent upon foreign aid and would not exist without this
support. In some cases NGOs active in welfare or service delivery have income
from public funds, but in most cases these funds have significant contributions
from foreign aid donors. The significant exception to this is South Africa. This
country not only houses a significant share of the region’s NGOs. It also has a
significant domestic donor community, some state funding of NGOs and
significant public funding through the commissioning of NGOs to undertake
welfare and service delivery. Foreign donor funding is still significant,
                                           
77 The report remains unpublished. The publication details are The Role of Non-Governmental
Organisations in the Southern African Development Community. A Report compiled by the
Committee Appointed by the SADC Council of Ministers, n.p. (Gaborone), n.p. (SADC Secretariat),
1999. This should also be read in conjunction with D. Barnard and Y. Terreblanche (eds.):
PRODDER: The Southern African Development Directory 2000, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research
Council 1999. The Prodder Directory is based on data from 1997-98.
78 Abie Dithlake, the Executive Director of the South African NGO Coalition (Sangoco) (and
President of SADC-CNGO) informed the team that they had some 3200 members, down from the
historical figure of 4000. They expected to be able to increase the membership figure to between
10 000 and 15 000. He estimated that there were over 80 000 NGOs in South Africa. Interview,
Johannesburg 31 May 2002.
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especially for certain types of NGO like those involved in advocacy work,
human rights issues or peace and conflict studies.
Most of these NGOs are focused on domestic issues with only a small
minority maintaining any regional or international network and even fewer
with a regional focus or agenda. The NGO umbrellas in each SADC member
country agreed to establish a SADC Council of NGOs, SADC-CNGO, at a
workshop in 1995.79 The organisation was launched in 1998 with the
Botswana Council of NGOs (Bocongo) elected the Interim Secretariat.
Bocongo is still the interim secretariat and SADC-CNGO has not really taken
off. Several of the stronger NGO umbrella bodies in the region informed the
team that plans were under way to revitalise their regional body. Both SADC
and the SADC-CNGO have agreed in principle to sign a Memorandum of
Understanding as regulated in the SADC Treaty. There has, however, not been
any visible action on this. The draft memo is currently with SADC for
approval by member states.
The main national trade unions and federations in the region joined hands in
establishing the Southern African Trade Union Co-Ordination Council
(SATUCC) in 1983.80 It is managed out of a small Secretariat in Gaborone. Its
work is constrained by a relatively low priority given to regional issues by its
member affiliates, most of which are very weak. It does, however, run a
regional occupational health and safety project and it is a strong participant in
SADC’s Employment and Labour Sector Co-ordinating Unit. The project was
chaired by Zambia and expected to be phased out in the second half of 2002
and integrated into the Directorate for Social and Human Development and
Special Programmes (SHDSP) in the SADC Secretariat. SATUCC officials
interviewed by the team expressed their support for the restructuring of SADC
but were concerned that the tripartite model might not be sufficiently
incorporated in the new structure.
The national business associations have been less active at the regional level.
At the tripartite negotiations on employment and labour issues they have been
represented by South African business. In 1999 a regional body was formed –
The Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCCI). Its
Secretariat was first based in Mauritius but is now housed at the Malawi
Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Blantyre.81
The various churches and religions in the region also maintain links and
networks, although those associations and networks do not correspond to the
SADC region as such. None of them have any working relations with SADC.
                                           
79 The discussion on SADC-CNGO is based on the 1999 SADC report and discussions with the
interim secretariat in Gaborone, the SADC-CNGO President and with a number of national umbrella
bodies.
80 This paragraph is based on interviews at the SATUCC Secretariat and on the official history
published as Labour Resource and Research Institute (ed.): Building a Regional Labour Movement:
The Southern African Trade Union Co-Ordination Council, SATUCC, Gaborone: SATUCC 2001.
81 The team held discussions with the Association’s senior officials in Blantyre and also met with
technical advisors from GTZ, a chief donor behind the ASCCI.
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The most extensive network is probably the Fellowship of Christian Councils
in Southern Africa. This brings together the protestant Council of Churches in
all Southern African countries, including Madagascar (but excluding DRC,
Mauritius and the Seychelles). They run a number of networks, on HIV/Aids,
on economic justice (focusing i.a. on globalisation and the debt problem),
internal refugees and uprooted people, and on humanitarian issues and
disaster relief. It has also – but without much success at the time of writing –
attempted to engage with Zimbabwe where the Council of Churches remains
deeply divided in its response to the political crisis.82
4.2 Sector networks and organisations
There are a number of sector networks under the SADC-CNGO umbrella.
Most (but not necessarily all) of the members of these loose networks are
affiliated to the various national NGO umbrella bodies. These networks are,
however, generally weak with limited activity (although individual member
organisation may be strong). SADC-CNGO’s ambition is that they shall
become fully operational over the next three years.
Monitoring SADC
A number of organisations are specifically established to monitor SADC and
regional co-operation, or they have established specific projects to achieve this.
The biggest here is the Harare-based Southern Africa Research and
Documentation Centre (SARDC).83 Commissioned by the SADC Secretariat,
they produce SADC’s official quarterly publication, SADC Today. They also
run a number of programmes, which currently produce a number of
publications indispensable for any monitoring of SADC. The regional
economic development and integration programme, in addition to producing
SADC Today, also prepares working papers on a number of issues, especially
a series termed 20 years of Development in Southern Africa. A Sectoral
Review of regional integration in Southern Africa. The democracy programme
produces the quarterly Renaissance, A Review of Democracy and Governance
in Southern Africa. The gender programme (The Women in Development
Southern Africa Awareness) works closely with the SADC Gender Unit and
produces amongst others the annual SADC Gender Monitor and a newsletter
on gender and development – GAD Exchange. Their Communicating the
Environment Programme puts out a CEP Fact Sheet six times a year. These
programmes have also produced several books and other reference material.
SARDC is also member of the SADC Electoral Support Network which i.a.
produces the Election Chronicle magazine. The other strong NGO in this
network is the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, a South African-based
NGO that has played a key role in shaping debates about electoral legislation
                                           
82 Interview with Benjamin Moleko, Deputy Secretary-General, Botswana Council of Churches, in
Gaborone 6 June 2002. The Botswana Council of Churches provides the secretariat for the
Fellowship of Christian Councils
83 More information is obtainable from the homepage www.sardc.net
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and election observation in the region.84 They also acted as the interim
secretariat of the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum.
The Institute of Global Dialogue, a South African foreign policy think-tank
has also run a project (now completed) which culminated with the most
comprehensive overview of SADC available to date.85 The outcome of a major
scenario exercise, involving scholars from a number of SADC countries, was
published as the final product of this project.86 The institute has now launched
new research-based projects on democratisation in Southern Africa and on
trade /competition policy.
In Namibia the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit has been holding
annual research workshops on aspects of SADC and regional integration. This
has brought together scholars from mainly Namibia, other SADC countries
and Germany. Papers from the 2001 workshop have been published in what is
envisaged as a yearbook on regional integration.87
SAPES – the regional research-cum-network institute based in Harare - has
historically played an important in the scholarly debate on SADC and regional
co-operation. It appears to have a less important role today. Among its recent
major monitoring publications the most important are the 1998 and 2000
SADC Regional Human Development Reports, published in co-operation with
UNDP and the SADC Secretariat.88
Monitoring-cum-research is also taking place in the peace and security
research milieus. Chief among those is the Pretoria-based Institute for Security
Studies which is producing much on the evolving security architecture and the
security policies through its journal African Security Review and a range of
other publications, including an excellent homepage (www.iss.co.za). The
Southern Africa Defence and Security Management Network, although mainly
a training programme (see below), has also put out some significant analysis
and reviews of SADC structures and policies.89 Other contributions have come
from the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town and to a lesser extent
from the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes in
Durban.
The South African Institute of International Affairs, which has hosted a
number of conferences and workshops on various dimensions of regional co-
operation, has also prepared for a monitoring programme. They have secured
                                           
84 See more on this organisation in www.eisa.org.za.
85 Published as the IGD Guide to the Southern African Development Community, Johannesburg:
Institute for Global Dialogue 2001. See also their homepage www.igd.org.za
86 Ref.
87 The first yearbook was published as D. Hansohm et al. (eds.) Monitoring Regional Integration in
Southern Africa, Yearbook volume 1 – 2001, Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan 2002. The 2002
workshop was held in June and it is expected that a volume 2 will be out before the end of the year.
88 The 1998 report focused on governance and human development while the main theme of the
second report was challenges and opportunities for regional integration. SAPES Books in Harare
published them both.
89 Some of this has appeared in the new Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies, published by
the SADSEM partner in Zimbabwe, the University of Zimbabwe’s Centre for Defence Studies.
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donor funding for a project on the SADC Organ and civil society as well as
monitoring of SADC through a planned SADC Barometer newsletter. At the
time of visiting the Institute had not yet been able to recruit sufficiently skilled
persons to run these projects.
Sector Networks
The Southern African Human Rights NGO Network (SAHRINGON) was
established in 1997. It is co-ordinated by the Lusaka-based Inter-African
Network of for Human Rights and Development (Afronet).90 Its main network
activities appear to be focused on campaigning against police brutality,
promotion of freedom of expression, and capacity building in human rights
education. The network appears to be dominated by legal activists and human
rights organisations. It has limited activities linked to SADC’s work (although
as shown in the subchapter below, individual member organisations do play
an important role also in relation to SADC’s evolving policy).
The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) is a regional NGO also active
in this area. It has a Secretariat in Windhoek and chapters in 11 SADC
countries. It was established in 1992 and focuses primarily on the need to
promote free, independent and pluralistic media. It seeks ways in which to
promote the free flow of information and co-operation between media
workers, as a principal means of nurturing democracy and human rights. It
has kept a watchful eye on evolving SADC policies in this area.91
There is a sector network in land and environmental issues. It brings together
a number of the key non-state actors, but there appears to be limited activity
at the regional level.92 There is also a Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources
Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN). They share offices with the SADC
Food Hub in Harare.93
Within the area of HIV/AIDS there has been a flourishing of NGOs (and
donor funding) in recent years. A number of major and NGO-run regional
projects have been launched and in addition HIV/AIDS activities have been
initiated by a number of existing NGOs in the fields of health and social work.
Some 10-15 NGOs dealing with AIDS are likely to have activities in each of
the SADC countries. An example of a larger regional effort, the Project
Support Group (PSG), supported by NORAD, will have projects in Namibia,
Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zambia and
Zimbabwe.
                                           
90 It does publish at irregular intervals a magazine, The Human Rights Observer, with information on
the activities of the network and the member organisations.
91 See e.g. the September 2001 issue of their free press magazine, which contains strong criticism of
the new SADC protocol on culture, information and sport.
92 Cf. also the Who is doing what on land rights issues in Southern Africa? Basic information
directory 2001 published by the Harare-based Zero in 2001. Zero is a regional environment
organisation and acts as the information node of the Land Rights Network of Southern Africa.
93 The Network publishes a newsletter, FANRPAN dialogue.
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There is also a flourishing network of NGOs in the gender field. Chief among
them are organisations such as the Women and Law in Southern Africa and
Women in Law and Development in Southern Africa. More information is
available in the material from SARDC (see above).
There is also a vocal group of NGOs and networks campaigning against
corporate globalisation, focusing on issues such as international finance, trade
and debt. This includes such organisations as the Church-linked Economic
Justice Network (Zimbabwe), the African Forum and Network on Debt and
Development (Zimbabwe), the Southern and Eastern African Trade,
Information and Negotiations Initiative (Zimbabwe), Jubilee South Africa and
others. The Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC)
provides a good web-based entry point into these groups and networks (see
www.aidc.org.za).
Education and training
Another important development is the growth and expansion in regional
training and educational programmes. The role of the strong higher education
and research sector in South Africa has been important here. It has facilitated
a number of major new postgraduate education programmes as well as
specially designed short- and long-term training programmes. An example of
this is the above-mentioned programme in defence management under the
auspices of the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network
(SADSEM). It is managed from the University of the Witwatersrand’s Centre
for Defence and Security Management but is jointly organised and delivered
with universities in six other SADC countries. They offer training courses in
democratic civil-military relations and management of peace support
operations to senior defence officials and military officers.
Another example of an expanding sector is NGO-based training programmes.
One case is the Harare-based Macroeconomic and Financial Management
Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa (MEFMI). Its activities are targeted at
building capacity in critical areas of macroeconomic and financial
management.
There has also been a growth in NGOs specialising in advising and training
other NGOs. One example in Harare is the Mweleko wa NGO, better know
as MWENGO. It was established in 1999 as a reflection and development
centre to enhance the capacity of NGOs in Eastern and Southern Africa. It is
currently playing an important role in equipping NGOs to respond to the new
challenges opened by the European Union/ACP Cotonou Agreement. Most
NGOs and other institutions offering training to this sector are, however,
based in South Africa.
4.3 What role for non-state actors?
The current restructuring of SADC has opened up new opportunities for non-
state actors in shaping policies by what is essentially an intergovernmental
organisation. This has been reinforced even more strongly by developments
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such as the EU/ACP Cotonou Agreement with its strong emphasis on the
participation of non-state actors, and the aid donors’ emphasis on involving
civil society in preparing poverty reduction strategy papers.
These opportunities may not be sufficiently exploited in part because the
NGO networks and organisations in most cases seem to be relatively unaware
of the ongoing restructuring of SADC. More fundamentally, however, the
organisations are in most cases weak and in many countries they struggle to
survive. Only South Africa, and to a lesser extent – and decreasingly so –
Zimbabwe have significant NGOs with a regional focus and interest.
This does not imply that NGOs will remain unimportant. In fact, we can
notice that the NGOs and networks discussed in this chapter have often
played a very important role in developing SADC policies on a range of issues,
including very sensitive areas such as the Protocol on Politics, Defence and
Security co-operation.
One case may serve to illustrate this: the adoption of SADC’s new protocol
against corruption was signed at the SADC Summit in August 2001.94 The
SADC Secretariat initiated the protocol in the form of a Draft Declaration
Against Corruption. This was rejected at the SADC Summit in Mauritius in
1998. An American NGO then invited the Harare-based Human Rights Trust
of Southern Africa (SAHRIT) to co-operate in efforts to resuscitate the anti-
corruption efforts. SAHRIT then initiated a series of high-level regional
roundtables, which culminated with a request to SAHRIT from the SADC
Legal Sector Chair (Namibia) to facilitate the development and adoption of a
SADC protocol against corruption. The draft prepared by the SAHRIT was
signed without substantial amendment.
The main role by NGOs will, however, be played not at the regional level, but
at the national level. SADC is a multilateral body with limited enforcement
capacity. The deepening of regional co-operation will take place mainly by
member countries adhering to a rapidly expanding set of common norms and
standards. It will be increasingly costly and demanding to deviate from or not
adhere to these common values and policies. NGOs and other non-state actors
will play an important role in ensuring this. This they will not do alone. They
will have to mobilise other popular forces, e.g. through Parliament, they will
benefit from networking and interaction with NGOs in neighbouring
countries and elsewhere, and they will benefit from financial and other
assistance from foreign donors.
                                           
94 This discussion relies on the presentation in N. Mashumba: “The SADC Protocol against
corruption”, Zimbabwe Human Rights Bulletin, Issue no 6, March 2002: 105-112.
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations
Less than a year has gone since the CMI 2001 study on SADC was prepared.
In that period SADC has made significant progress both with the restructuring
and with the substance of co-operation and integration. Member States
officially support restructuring and the ideas behind it as strongly as before,
but this may change if further progress is not made.
A closer look at the unfolding picture reveals a number of ways in which
achievements do not quite equal expectations and plans.
- The RISDP process has moved forward but appears to be considerably
behind the timetable.
- The study of SADC’s organisational structure had, by late June 2002, not
yet taken off.
- The closure of the SCUs and setting up of the Directorates at HQ in
Gaborone has proceeded quite well. The Secretariat is, however, still
weak compared to its tasks and there may be some tendencies to
bureaucratisation.
- Councils and Summit meetings have been held as planned but the first
meeting of the ICM has been postponed.
SADC has achieved progress in some substantive areas as for instance:
- A ministerial decision has brought agreement on a major part of the long
negotiated Rules of Origin of the Free Trade Area.
- SADC took an early initiative for humanitarian assistance to deal with the
emerging food crisis in the region.
- MOUs on “Macroeconomic Convergence” and “Co-operation in
Taxation” have been agreed and signed.
- A “mini” Donor Conference has been arranged.
The region has lately had reason to hope for the end of both the 30-year-old
war in Angola as well as the war between Rwanda and the DRC. Peace in the
region is not complete but a great step towards it has been taken.
Essentially, SADC’s challenges are the same as those outlined less than a year
ago, but for some of them a solution is increasingly urgent. Missed deadlines
and other shortcomings pointed out in the report do not appear to endanger
the future success of the organisation but they need to be dealt with before
they affect the enthusiasm of Member States, donors and other stakeholders.
5.1 Challenges for SADC
The first and most important challenge in the near term is the completion of
the institutional restructuring process. Whereas the closure of SCUs and the
establishment of the Secretariat have proceeded, the delay in starting the study
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of SADC’s organisational structure has slowed down the pace of progress in
building Secretariat capacity, thereby also retarding progress in
implementation of SADC’s protocols. Delay in getting SNCs functional means
that the visibility of SADC at the national level and therefore the popular
sense of ownership is negatively affected.
Second, as already indicated in our 2001 report, preparation of the RISDP has
been allotted all too little time and resources. Progress in preparation of the
indicative plan is vital for building consensus at the levels of strategy and
implementation as well as to communicate SADC’s plans to stakeholders,
including the general population of the region.
Third, the relationship between SADC and the continental initiatives, AU and
NEPAD, has for some time been characterised by the fact that the attention of
major players has been focused on continental issues. After the G8 Kananaskis
summit and the AU Durban summit it is possible that NEPAD and AU/AEC in
the longer run will start considering SADC and other RECs as important areas
for concentration. SADC is expected to look to NEPAD in its restructuring
exercise but in the near future it is not likely that relations between SADC and
the continental organisations are going to be very active. There are hopes that
the regional communities may benefit from the NEPAD infrastructure
programme but that would mean a much more rapid development of stepping
up ODA than looks likely at present.
Fourth, the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security needs to be strengthened
organisationally and the SADC Secretariat’s role in servicing the Organ sorted
out. Notable progress has taken place in developing a common approach to
the Organ and its area of operation and more progress may be expected.
Despite an important start at the September 2001 meeting in Harare, where
SADC member states for the first time publicly critiqued one of the member
states, it is, however, difficult to escape the conclusion that the attention to
issues of governance and human rights has been restrained. Important reasons
for exercising restraint are likely to be SADC States’ perceived need to
maintain stability in the region and the tendency for regional leaders to close
ranks in the face of externally based criticism.
Fifth, it appears important to ask what the real driving forces behind SADC
are. The reason why the organisation does not quite live up to its expectations
may lie in the Secretariat, in the governing bodies or the relations between
them. The oncoming study of SADC’s organisational structure might consider
the relations between the governing structure and the Secretariat. A reason for
the less than entirely successful operations of SADC might be the dearth of
common and strong interest among Member States in building a SADC with
supranational features. South Africa and Zimbabwe have to some extent been
“political engines” in SADC but there are signs that expectations of criticism
from the other countries for “taking over” may make South Africa less
interested. To keep up the political momentum, a strong alliance of Member
States, which can form an “engine” for SADC, is needed. Unless such an
alliance appears there is a danger that the organisation may be left politically
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unguided to the detriment of its attention to crises and development problems
in the region.
Sixth, the present study included an examination of the role of NGOs and
other non-state actors in the region. Although most of these organisations are
quite weak, they are doing work in parallel with SADC in many fields.
Although the majority of them focus on national - and not regional - issues
they are likely to support programme implementation and compliance with
SADC common values and policies at the national level. Constructive co-
operation between SADC and these organisations and support to them will
strengthen the implementation machinery for co-operation and integration.
Seventh, it is still important that SADC tackles the problem of distribution of
benefits from trade and other integration activities. The problems seen by the
MMTZ are caused by the dramatic differences in levels of income and
industrialisation between the FTA countries. The new SACU agreement
signifies that the SA and the BLNS countries feel that they have a stake in the
Customs Union at least for some time to come.
Eighth, in September 2002 negotiations on an Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) with the European Union will start. The process is likely to
become important also for relations between the RECs of the southern and
eastern African region. If SADC and COMESA seriously consider an EPA
covering the greater region, this may open perspectives for much more active
co-operation and co-ordination between the two. One may perhaps even
imagine that integration attempts in the future will comprise the whole eastern
region of Africa, from Cape to Cairo. The perspectives are broad, and so are
the political and technical questions to be compromised and solved.
5.2 Implications for Norwegian Support
Norwegian support to SADC right from its start in 1980 was briefly examined
in the CMI 2001 report referred to above. The enduring relationship is in itself
a basis for future support, a new phase of which was initiated by the NOK 10
million allocation in 2001 for the purpose of implementing the restructuring
plan.
The implications drawn for Norwegian support in our 2001 study at the end
of 200195 still stand. In summary it was recommended that
• Norway should offer flexible and short-term assistance during the period
of restructuring. It was thought that SADC would need finance to
replace member states funding, and there was a need to keep active
projects and pipeline projects moving during the transition phase.
• NORAD’s capacity to monitor the co-operation and integration process
in southern Africa should be stepped up.
• Proposed guidelines for a Norwegian support profile were:
                                           
95 Section 4.1 p60 ff
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- To focus on the core business of SADC (economic integration and
peace and stability)
- Render support in areas where Norway has the skills and resources to
make a strong contribution
- Be prepared to offer assistance in capacity building for co-ordination of
donor assistance
- Closely follow SADC’s efforts to facilitate conflict resolution and
stability in the region
- In a catalytic manner, contribute to the use of South Africa’s crucial
resources, strengths and capacities for the benefit of the region.
- Aim to apply Norway’s bilateral programmes with countries in the
region in such a way that they support projects and activities that can
strengthen national institutions and enable them to take part in and
benefit from regional co-operation, reducing obstacles that limit
implementation of e.g. the Trade Protocol.
The conclusions from the mini donor conference in February 2002 by and
large confirmed the appropriateness of these directions.
The developments of the last year leave scope for commenting on the above
and considering additional implications for Norwegian support.
First, the imperative of finalising the restructuring process in good order is
clearer than before and there is an increasing need to pursue considerable
flexibility with regard to the transition period. A “slush fund” approach, in
line with the present support for the restructuring process, may be
appropriate. Under such an approach SADC would indicate total but
unspecified needs within the broad area of institutional restructuring for a
period of 2-3 years. Disbursement would take place with a minimum of
formality through a well functioning link with the Harare Embassy. The
flexible frame for support and disbursement would require strong accounting
and auditing routines and regular consultations to determine the future path
of the programme.
Second, the mini donor meeting indicated SADC’s needs for resources in a
number of problem areas related to restructuring. Norway ought to consider
how to be of assistance in these areas. Some of them could clearly be covered
by the “slush fund” approach mentioned above.
Third, in terms of sectoral support, consensus on the Norwegian side regards
the energy sector as crucial for development, suitable for various forms of
regional co-operation and able to benefit from Norwegian expertise and
technology. Norway should, as soon as possible, communicate with relevant
regional organisations and SADC to initiate a discussion of how Norwegian
expertise and funding may be applied within the sector in such a way that
SADC’s ultimate goal of sustainable poverty alleviation is supported.
Fourth, a so-called “core group” of International Co-operating Partners (ICPs)
was formed soon after the end of the mini donor meeting. Norway was
referred to as a “country having a significant interest in working with the core
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group”. Signals from the group may indicate that there is an inclination to
move towards one or another form of “basket finance”. Norway ought to
seek an active role in the group and contribute to innovative thinking about
suitable modalities of development co-operation. As the RISDP under the
present circumstances will not be likely to form the basis for the ICP support,
the planned ICP conference in October 2002 will require a different format
from what was initially planned.
Fifth, although the SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security lacks
operative policies, financial resources and operational capacity, SADC has
made bold attempts to address political, defence and security issues and
establish procedures. The importance of defence and security for economic
growth and regional integration would suggest that Norway at an early stage
consider how the Organ may be supported and initiate a discussion about this
with SADC.
Sixth, the analysis of non-state actors in the region indicates that there is not a
very strong base of such organisations which play a role in regional co-
operation and integration. The few NGOs which have regional networks
support SADC’s efforts in sectors like health, education and training. They are
also active in monitoring and analysis of regional integration. National NGOs
in the region can support SADC at the national level by acting as watchdogs
for Member States’ adherence to SADC’s common norms and standards.
Support to NGOs with good potential in one or the other field will promote
the acceleration of regional integration.
Seventh, if Norway is to step up its support for regional integration
considerably, it will not be a matter of working with SADC alone. Several
organisations in the region will have operational and project responsibility for
regional integration activities. Some may be connected to SADC in a similar
way to RERA or SAPP or they may be free-standing non-state actors. In this
context it will be necessary to consider stepping up Norwegian aid
management capacity in the region as well its structure and division of
responsibilities with the NORAD HQ.
Eight, over the last year, African initiatives for peace, good governance,
growth and development have progressed rapidly through the conversion from
OAU to AU and through the emergence of NEPAD. The longer-term effects
on SADC may be considerable, particular in the AU/AEC setting that
considers RECs as building blocks for a rapid development of continental
integration. In the short term, with implementation mechanisms in SADC, AU
and NEPAD at an emerging stage, the scope for donor support to continental /
regional activities will not be great. The infrastructure, water and energy
sectors could, however, be areas where NORAD increasingly will have to
consider the continental aspects of support for SADC.
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Annex 1: List of persons interviewed
Malawi:
Alexander E. Bulirani SADC SADC/GEF Lake Malawi Environment
Management Project
Emmanuel Ted Nandolo Executive Secretary, Council for NGOs in Malawi
Dr Kanyama-Phiri Principal, Bunda College of Agriculture, University
of Malawi
Ian Gilson Principal Secretary, Tax Policy Section, Ministry of
Finance
Helmut Müller-Glodde Programme Co-ordinator, Malawi-Germany
Business and Employment Promotion Programme,
German Technical Assistance
William Kabambe Deputy Secretary General, Malawi Congress of
Trade Unions
Charles Njovu Chief Economist, Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environmental Affairs
Exley B.D. Silumbu Chief Economist, Malawi Confederation of
Chambers of Commerce and Industry
Isaac M.C. Chimutu Operations Director, Malawi Confederation of
Chambers of Commerce and Industry
J.H. Koreia-Mpatsa President, Malawi Confederation of Chambers of
Commerce and Industry
K. Desai Chairman, Garment and Textile Manufacturers
Association, Malawi Confederation of Chambers of
Commerce and Industry
Leonard D. Sefu Director, Department of National Parks and
Wildlife
Shaibu A. Mapila Director of Fisheries, Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environmental Affairs
Aloysious M. Kamperewera Deputy Director of Environmental Affairs, Ministry
of Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs
William Mutembe SADC Forestry Sector Co-ordination Unit,
Department of Forestry, Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environmental Affairs
Christian Fedlmeier SADC Forestry Sector Co-ordination Unit,
Technical Co-ordination Unit, Department of
Forestry, Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environmental Affairs
C M I
70
Asbjørn Eidhammer Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy
Arild Skaara First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy
Grasiano Bulla Development Centre
  Mary Shawa  Ministry of Gender, Youth and Community Services
South Africa:
Richard Humphries Co-ordinator, Southern African Regional Poverty
Network, Human Sciences Research Council
Pundy Pillay Resident Representative and Senior Economist, RTI
South Africa
Christopher Loewald Chief Director, International Economics, National
Treasury
Huntly Pringle International Economics, National Treasury
Abie Ditlhake Executive Director, South African National NGO
Coalition and President SADC NGO Coalition
Hennie Maters Senior Consultant, Ecorys Research and Consulting
(Team Leader, Evaluation of Danish Regional
Assistance to Southern Africa)
Shannon Field Deputy Director, Institute for Global Dialogue
Garth le Pere Director, Institute for Global Dialogue
Janine Rauch Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
(Team member, Evaluation of Danish Regional
Assistance to Southern Africa)
Mfundo Nkuhlu General Manager: Strategy and Planning, South
African Revenue Services
Erick Kieck South African Revenue Services
Schalk J. McDuling Deputy Director, Foreign Relations Policy, Defence
Secretariat – Department of Defence
E. Thusi Deputy Director, Foreign Relations Policy, Defence
Secretariat – Department of Defence
Jackie Cilliers Director, Institute for Security Studies
Mark Malan Programme Manager, Institute for Security Studies
Kathryn Sturman Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies
Thaninga Shope-Linney General Manager – Communications and
Marketing, Nepad Secretariat
Steven Friedman Director, Centre for Policy Studies
C M I
71
Oupa Bodibe Co-ordinator in the Secretariat Office, COSATU
Ross Herbert Africa Research Fellow, South African Institute of
International Affairs
Elizabeth Sidiropolous Director of Studies, South African Institute of
International Affairs
I. Mohlolo Siko Director, Foreign Relations Policy, Defence
Secretariat, Department of Defence
Roger Southall Executive Director, Democracy and Governance,
Human Sciences Research Council
Vino Naidoo Senior Researcher, Democracy and Governance,
Human Sciences Research Council
Sanusha Naidu Research Specialist, Integrated Development,
Human Sciences Research Council
Adam Habib Professor and Director, Centre for the Study of Civil
Society, School of Development Studies, University
of Natal
Pyt Douma Consultant, Nedworc (Holland) (member of team
evaluating Danish Regional Assistance to Southern
Africa)
Thembi Majola Deputy Director General, Presidential Support Unit,
Ministry of Intelligence
Willy Nhlapo Director General, Presidential Support Unit,
Ministry of Intelligence
Ajay Bramdeo Chief Directorate: Africa Multilateral, Department
of Foreign Affairs
Sifiso Ngwenyia Director, Southern Africa SADC, Department of
Trade and Industry
John Barrat DFID Southern Africa
Svein Baera First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy
Steinar Hagen Councillor, Norwegian Embassy
Jon Bech Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy
Zimbabwe:
Wolfgang Zehender German Technical Co-operation, Co-ordinator,
Advisory Service for Private Business (Southern
Africa)
Mothae A. Maruping Executive Director, Macroeconomic & Financial
Management Institute of Eastern and Southern
Africa (MEFMI)
C M I
72
Soumana Sako Executive Secretary, The African Capacity Building
Foundation
Arild Eik Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy
Hege Hertzberg First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy
Ingebjørg Støfring Minister Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy
Dan B. Ndlela Associate, Zimconsult
Masipula Sithole Director, Mass Public Opinion Institute
Munetsi Madakufamba Editor – SADC Today, Head of Programme for
Regional Economic Development and Integration
(REDI), Southern African Research and
Documentation Centre
Ibbo Mandaza Chairman, SAPES Trust
Namibia:
Robin Sherbourne Director, Institute for Public Policy Research
Peter Mwatile Director, Policy, Planning and Economics, Ministry
of Fisheries and Marine Resources
Siseho C. Simasiku Chief Executive Officer, Electricity Control Board
Constantia U. Pandeni President, Mine Workers Union of Namibia
Willem Nekwiyu Trade Policy Analyst: Trade Policy Division,
Ministry of Trade and Industry
Andre du Pisani Professor, Department of Political and
Administrative Studies, University of Namibia
William A. Lindeke Professor, Department of Political and
Administrative Studies, University of Namibia
Esau Kaakunga Senior Economist, Policy Research Division, Bank of
Namibia
Paul Kalenga Principal Economist, Policy Research Division,
Research Department
Nepeti Nicanor Consultant, Project Management
Kaire Mbuende Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Information and
Broadcasting
Dirk Hansohm Director, Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit
Johan Dahl Senior Researcher, Namibian Economic Policy
Research Unit
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Botswana
Tom Robbert Economic Advisor (Regional), Delegation of the
European Commission
Modise Modise Permanent Secretary, Development, Office of the
President
Serwalo Tumelo Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning
Hartmut Krebs Project Manager, German Technical Co-operation
Maria Overeem Director, Planning and Research, Botswana Training
Authority
Abisha Nyangwo OH&S Coordination, Southern African Trade Union
Co-ordination Council
Benni Bundsgaard Chief Technical Advisor, Regional OH&S
Programme, Southern African Trade Union Co-
ordination Council
Baledzi Gaolathe Minister of Finance and Development Planning
Ernest Sipho Mpofu Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Banny K. Molosiwa Secretary for Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance
and Development Planning
S. M. Sekwakwa Director Economic Affairs (Macro), Division of
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning
Scott Allen Senior Policy Advisor, USAID Regional Centre for
Southern Africa
Balefi Tsie Department of Political Studies, University of
Botswana
N.H. Fidzani Director, Botswana Institute for Development Policy
Studies
Gaogakwe Phorano Executive Secretary, Botswana Council of Non-
Governmental Organisations
Benjamin Moleko Deputy Secretary General, Botswana Christian
Council
SADC Secretariat, Botswana
Prega Ramsamy Executive Secretary
Themba Mhlongo Chief Director
A.E. Mondlane Principal economist
Esther V. Kanaimba Public Relations Officer
C M I
74
Jean-Claude Legoupil Technical Advisor, SACCAR/Directorate 2, Food,
Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR)
M. Molapeng Head, SACCAR/Directorate 2, Food, Agriculture and
Natural Resources (FANR)
Fudzai Pamacheche Principal Economist, Supervisor Directorate 1, Trade
Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI)
Gideon Phiri Private Sector Co-ordinator
Moeketsi Senaoana Senior Macro Economic Policy Advisor
Stephen Sianga Senior Economist
Robert Kirk Trade Advisor, Directorate 1, Trade Industry,
Finance and Investment (TIFI)
Maria Tali Librarian
Mozambique:
Jan Arne Munkebye Minister Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy
E. H. Msolomba Director, SADC Transport and Communication
Commission
Alvaro Casimiro Co-ordinator, LINK – Forum de Organizacoes Nao
Governamentais
Pedro Cuoto Director, Gabinete de Estudos, Ministry of Plan and
Finance
Juao Maendiende Gabinete de Estudos, Ministry of Plan and Finance
Ismael Valigy Second Secretary, Directorate for Europe and
Americas, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Timothy W. Burn Team leader, Private Sector Enabling Environment,
USAID Mission to Mozambique
Patricio Jose Deputy Rector, Instituto Superior de Relacoes
Internacionais
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference
NORAD has given CMI the task to carry out a study to give status for the
restructuring of SADC and the regional co-operation in southern Africa.
The report from the study shall have the same format and length as the report
of the restructuring of SADC carried out by CMI in 2001.
The main purpose of the study is to give NORAD up-dated information of the
institutional restructuring process within SADC.
The Study
Shall give an up-dated presentation of the ongoing restructuring of SADC and
give status on
- The restructuring of the Secretariat in Gaborone
- The establishment of National Committees; and
- The development of SADC’s Strategic Plan, included a special analysis of
SADC’s ongoing work with financial administration and the development
of a Protocol for macroeconomic harmonisation.
In addition the study shall focus more broadly on the following three areas:
- SADC from the point of view of good governance, democracy and
conflict solutions specially in the light of the situation in Zimbabwe;
- The relations between SADC and other regional/continental initiatives,
specially NEPAD; and
- The extent and character of regional co-operation between non-
governmental actors in the SADC countries.
26.4.02
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Annex tables and figures
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Annex Table 1: Status of Launch of SNCs
Member States Status / Date of SNC
establishment
Current status
1 Angola 8th May 2002 To be launched in June 2002.
Report to be submitted June
2002
2 Botswana Established Discussions ongoing with
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung on
resources for launching SNC
3 Democratic
Republic of
Congo
No information received No information received
4 Lesotho Process of establishment at
advanced stage
Preparations for launching
advanced and funds disbursed
5 Malawi October 2001 SNC to be launched in June
2002. Funds disbursed,
Committee appointed and
national secretariat established
6 Mauritius June 2002 Consultations ongoing to
establish SNC
7 Mozambique Matter before Cabinet To be launched in June 2002.
Secretariat awaiting budget
proposal (Japanese funds)
8 Namibia 4 March 2002 Secretariat awaiting budget
proposal and to be advised on the
date of launching
9 Seychelles Committee dealing with
SADC affairs in place
since February 2000
Funding not requested
10 South Africa Cabinet decision on the
structure of SNC still
awaited
Funding not required
11 Swaziland Being established To be launched before August
2002. Secretariat awaiting budget
proposal
12 Tanzania April 2002 Funds for workshop disbursed
13 Zambia December 2001 Launched on 11 April 2002.
Report of workshop submitted
14 Zimbabwe Established Funds for workshop awaited and
launch expected early August
2002.
C M I
78
Annex Table 2: Member Countries contributions to SADC budget. Per Cent
Share.
Angola 7,0
Botswana 6,8
DRC 8,6
Lesotho 5,3
Malawi 5,6
Mauritius 6,5
Mozambique 6,4
Namibia 6,0
Seychelles 2,0
RSA 20,0
Swaziland 5,5
Tanzania 7,7
Zambia 6,2
Zimbabwe 6,3
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Annex Table 3: Summary of Projects and Initiatives for
the NEPAD Short-term Action Plan
POWER SYSTEMS PROJECTS
Mepanda Uncua Hydropower
Ethiopia-Sudan Interconnection
West Africa Power Pool (WAPP) Program
Algeria-Morocco-Spain Interconnection (Strengthening)
Algeria-Spain Interconnection & Algeria Gas-fired Power Station
Mozambique-Malawi Interconnection
Gas/Oil Transmission Projects
Kenya-Uganda Oil Pipeline
West Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP)
Libya-Tunisia-Gas Pipeline
Studies
Grand Inga Integrator
DRC-Angola-Namibia Interconnection
Nigeria-Algeria Gas Pipeline
Sub-Regional Interconnections (East, West, Central)
Capacity Building (Regional)
AFREC Operationalisation & REC Capacity Building
Africa Energy Information System & Planning
Tools
Training of Energy Experts
Facilitation (Regional)
Policies and Strategies
Energy Protocol
Co-operation in new and renewable energy
Co-operation in improving energy efficiency & reliability of supply
Co-operation in Oil and Gas trade, refining/processing
Co-operation in rural energy
WATER AND SANITATION SECTOR REGION
A: Enabling Environment for Regional Cooperation:
Water Resource Planning and Management – Nile Basin East Africa
Support of New and Existing River Basin Organizations Several regions
Action Plan for the Integrated
Water Resources in West Africa
West Africa
Water Resources Management in Central Region
Central Africa
B: Support to Development of National Integrated Water
Resources Management Policies:
Support for the Development and Implementation of National
Water Sector Policies and Strategies - SADC
Southern Africa
C: Meeting Urgent Basic Services:
Rural Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation in the Niger Basin West Africa
Combating Drought and Desertification in the Maghreb North Africa
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D: Improving Water Wisdom:
Water Resources Assessment in SADC Southern Africa
Implementation of IGAD HYCOS East Africa
Strengthening of the ABN Interstate Forecast Center (CIP) West Africa
E: Strengthening the Financial Base for the Desired Water Future:
Study to Improve Financing Mechanism for Development of the
Water Sector
All regions
BETTER AND SAFER ROADS TO BRING TOGETHER
AFRICA
Institutional, policy advice, road safety .
Studies
(estimated on the basis of regional programmes)
Regional roads upgrading and construction
(Based on projects included in REC’s programmes, which meet the
criteria mentioned above and for which studies are available at
least to feasibility level).
PORTS REGIONS/
COUNTRIES
Physical
Mombasa Port: expansion of the capacity of the container terminal
and berth conversion.
Kenya, EAC
Nacala Port: rehabilitation in support of concessioning Mozambique-
Malawi: SADC
Lobito Port: rehabilitation, transhipment facilities Angola
Abidjan Port: container terminal, dredging of Vridi Canal. Cote d’Ivoire
Dakar Port: rehabilitation and construction of container terminal Senegal, UEMOA,
ECOWAS
Djibouti Port: container handling facilities Djibouti, Ethiopia,
IGAD
Studies
Mayumba Port pre-feasibility study Gabon, ECCAS
RAILWAYS REGIONS/
COUNTRIES
Institutional
Support for concessioning of railways: Technical assistance for
strategy formulation; regulatory capacity building; and provision of
transaction advisors.
Kenya, Uganda,
Tanzania, Zambia,
Swaziland
Physical
Rehabilitation of Railways in support of concessioning Uganda
Railways Malaba – Kampala railway (part of 250 kms), including
bridges
East
Port Bell and Jinja wagon ferry terminals rehab. East
Improving Port Bell – Kampala rail section East
Kenya Railways Nakuru – Kisumu rail section rehabilitation (part
of 250 kms), including bridges
Southern
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Tanzania Railways Track rehabilitation, upgrading signals
telecoms for Dodoma – Tabora – Mwanza section
Southern
Nacala Corridor Railway Rehabilitation of 77 Kms (Cuamba –
Entre Lagos).
Southern
Studies
Feasibility study for railways interconnection: West and Central
Feasibility study of the Brazzaville– Kinshasa rail/road bridge Central Region
Feasibility study of Trans-Maghreb railway system North Region
Undertake needs assessment study for Angola and D.R. Congo for
rehabilitation of the Benguela railway corridor system
Angola, D.R.C.
SAFE SKIES - AIR TRANSPORT
Institutional and physical
Support for implementation of the Yamoussoukro
Decision(liberalisation) and aviation restructuring:
All regions
Regional co-ordination and exchange of information and best
practices
All countries
Regulatory capacity building
Upgrading airport security
Upgrading airport infrastructure and related facilities to category 1
standard,
Two non category-
1 major airports
per sub-region
(total 10)
Establishment of Upper Airspace Control Centre (UACC) SADC & EAC
GNSS project
- Implementation of test bed
- Installation of ground infrastructure
Africa & Indian
Ocean region
Establishment of joint safety oversight units (COSCAP) West, Southern&
East sub-regions
Central, North-
East, North
Studies
Establishment of Upper Airspace Control Centres (UACC) - Study to cover
other sub-regions
(West, Central,
North-East, North)
Aviation infrastructure needs assessment study Angola and D.R.
Congo
ICT INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT FACILITATION
PROJECTS
SPONSORS
Telecommunications Equipment Manufacturing in Africa Study ITU-Africa
Region
ICT Policy and Regulatory Framework Harmonization at Regional
Level
ATU, RECs
Strengthening of African Telecommunications and ICT Institutions Identified
Institutions
Programme to Enhance Africa’s Participation in the Global ICT
Policy and Decision Making Fora
ATU, RECs,
NTOs
The ICT Human Resource Capacity Development Initiative for
Africa
Whole Continent
ATU/ITU-
Africa Reg
The SADC Regional Infrastructure Initiative(SRII) Southern SADC
The RASCOM Project Whole Continent RASCOM
SAT-3/WASC/SAFE- Utilisation to Improve Interconnectivity South, Central,
West, East
SAT3/ WASC/
SAFE
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Annex Table 4: SADC protocols signed and ratified
Protocol Date of signature Entered
into
force
Comments
1 Immunities and privileges 1992, August 30.09.93
2 Shared watercourse systems 1995, August 28.09.98 Angola signed Aug. 1999
3 Transport, communication and
meteorology
1996, August 06.06.98
4 Energy 1996, August 17.04.98 Mozambique to ratify, DRC and
Seychelles to accede
5 Combating illicit drug trafficking 1996, August 20.03.99 Angola signed Aug. 1999, DRC to
accede
6 Trade 1996, August 25.01.00 Angola, DRC, Seychelles to accede
7 Education and training 1997, September 31.07.00 Angola, DRC and Seychelles to
accede
8 Mining 1997, September 10.02.00 Angola and Swaziland to ratify,
DRC and Seychelles to accede
9 Tourism 1998, September Angola, DRC and Seychelles to
sign and ratify, Malawi, South
Africa and Zambia to ratify
10 Wildlife conservation and law
enforcement
1999, August Angola, DRC, Seychelles, South
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and
Zimbabwe to ratify
11 Health 1999, August Angola, DRC, Seychelles,
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe
to ratify
12 Tribunal and the rules of
procedure
2000, August DRC to sign. All except Botswana,
Mauritius and Namibia to ratify
13 Legal affairs 2000, August DRC to sign. All countries except
Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia
to ratify
14 Revised protocol on shared
watercourses
2000, August DRC to sign, All to ratify except
Lesotho, Botswana, Mauritius,
Namibia, Mozambique and South
Africa
15 Amendment protocol on trade 2000, August 07.08.00 Angola, DRC and Seychelles
required to deposit instruments of
implementation
16 Politics, defence and security co-
operation
2001, August Angola to sign and ratify. All
except Botswana, Lesotho,
Mauritius, Mozambique and
Tanzania to ratify
17 Control of firearms, ammunition
and other related materials
2001, August Angola to sign and ratify. All
except Botswana and Mauritius to
ratify
18 Fisheries 2001, August All except Botswana, Mauritius
and Namibia to ratify
19 Corruption 2001, August All except Botswana and Mauritius
to ratify
20 Culture, information and sport 2001, August All except Botswana, Mauritius
and Mozambique to ratify
Source: SADC Secretariat: “Update on the Status of Member States Signatures and
Ratifications of and accessions to the SADC Treaty, Protocols and other Legal Instruments.
As at 6 September, 2002.
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Annex figure 1: The new SADC Structure
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This study was commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for
Development Co-operation (NORAD).  It is a follow up to
“Assessing the Restructuring of SADC – Positions, Policies and
Progress. Chr Michelsen Institute (CMI Report R2001).
The study examines the status of SADC’s restructuring
exercise as at mid-2002, reviews SADC’s relation to continental
initiatives, SADC’s engagement in the Zimbabwe crisis and finally
the role of non-state actors in regional co-operation and integration.
Support for the restructuring process among members has
not weakened.  Whether problems of support may arise in the future
will partly depend on the success of restructuring and progress on
substance.  On several counts there has, however, been slippage
compared to the quite optimistic timetable set in early 2001.
Despite staff shortages and administrative turbulence caused by the
restructuring exercise, over the last year SADC moved perceptibly
forward on substantive issues.
The Organ for Politics, Peace and Stability, has made
progress in establishing procedures and mechanisms for
intervention. However, the Organ still lacks operative policies,
financial resources and operational capacity. It is difficult to escape
the conclusion that SADC has not sufficiently pursued the issue of
governance and human rights since it began to address the
Zimbabwe situation.
SADC will both influence and be influenced by NEPAD.
SADC would take NEPAD into account during the ongoing
restructuring.  There will be a need for regional/continental co-
ordination mechanisms if and when the NEPAD infrastructure
programme, based on regional projects, takes off.
Non-state actors / NGOs may not be involved in regional
matters as much as they could be because they are generally weak
and unaware of the change in SADC’s policy towards NGOs. Most
of them have no regional links and concentrate their activities at
the national level. But may potentially play a significant role in
guarding the maintenance of SADC norms and standards.
Regarding Norwegian support to SADC, the report
recommends that NORAD consider the possibility of a “slush
fund”.  Under such an approach, SADC would indicate total
unspecified needs within the broad area of institutional
restructuring for a period of 2-3 years. It is also recommended that
in the near term Norway should consider sectoral aspects of its
longer-term support to SADC; that substantial support to SADC
will require that Norwegian aid management to be stepped up far
beyond present capacity and that Norway seek an active role in the
core ICP group formed after the mini donor meeting in February
2002.
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